The impact of contract enforcement efficiency on debt maturity structure using mathematical derivation and comparative static analysis

In recent years, the systematic use of advanced mathematical methods to express, study and argue economic theories has become an important branch and research hotspot in economics. The choice of debt maturity structure is an interesting economics issue in corporate finance. The signing of debt financing contract is not only the enterprises’ independent behavior, but also will be affected by the contract environment. Differences in the contractual environment will inevitably lead to differences in the efficiency of contract enforcement between borrowers and lenders in debt contracts. This paper introduces the contract enforcement efficiency factor on the basis of the standard structure model constructed by Holmstrom and Tirole, and then theoretically investigates the influence mechanism of contract enforcement efficiency on debt maturity structure based on the mediating role of contract enforcement efficiency on the investors’ liquidation claims. By transforming the financing contract into a linear programming problem, and then solving the optimization model, mathematical derivation and static comparative analysis, the research shows that as the efficiency of contract enforcement increases, the amount of short-term debt and long-term debt increases, while the direction change in debt maturity structure is uncertain and the specific relationship between them is closely related to the magnitude of all exogenous variables.

Does information technology governance strengthen or weaken contract control in digital platform relationships?

PurposeThis study investigates both direct and moderation effects of two dimensions of contract control and information technology governance on platform participants' financial performance.Design/methodology/approachUsing data collected from 384 platform participants from China's two largest digital platforms, hierarchical regression is used to validate the conceptual model and hypotheses.FindingsThe empirical results show that contract completeness and information technology governance independently improved financial performance, while contract enforcement had an inverted U-shaped effect on financial performance. Furthermore, information technology governance amplified the positive effect of contract completeness, but not of contract enforcement, on financial performance.Originality/valueThis study advances the literature on partnership control by showing the interactive role of information technology governance and contract control. It also enriches research on information technology usage by revealing how information technology governance benefits business partnerships. Finally, it extends transaction cost theory by demonstrating that different dimensions of contracts have different effects on governing interfirm relationships.

Whither Formal Contracts?

To measure the benefits of formal contract enforcement for society, I create a market with merchants and buyers, in which buyers can choose whether to buy, and whether to pay. A set of multiple “state‐favored” ethnic groups control the state. I experimentally vary whether formal contracts are required and the composition of buyer‐merchant pairs. The design separately identifies the effect of the contracts on the buyers' incentive to pay and on their incentive to buy. I document two ways in which society limits the benefits of contracts. First, contracts reduce buyer cheating, thus increasing merchants' profits, if, and only if, the merchant is state‐favored. Buyers' beliefs suggest that the merchants can enforce the contracts if, and only if, the merchant is state‐favored. Second, holding constant whether the pair is state‐favored, contracts only influence buyer choices when the buyer and the merchant belong to two, different, state‐favored ethnic groups. Buyers' choices and beliefs confirm that, in that case, the contracts are expected to be enforceable, but they have no effect on buyers' choices because reputation already governs the incentives to cheat within groups. The findings temper the view of the state as independent from society, offer a rationale for why contracts are not adopted, and nuance the notion of state weakness.