The benefits of impossible tests: Assessing the role of error-correction in the pretesting effect

Relative to studying alone, guessing the meanings of unknown words can improve later recognition of their meanings, even if those guesses were incorrect – the pretesting effect (PTE). The error-correction hypothesis suggests that incorrect guesses produce error signals that promote memory for the meanings when they are revealed. The current research sought to test the error-correction explanation of the PTE. In three experiments, participants studied unfamiliar Finnish-English word pairs by either studying each complete pair or by guessing the English translation before its presentation. In the latter case, the participants also guessed which of two categories the word belonged to. Hence, guesses from the correct category were semantically closer to the true translation than guesses from the incorrect category. In Experiment 1, guessing increased subsequent recognition of the English translations, especially for translations that were presented on trials in which the participants’ guesses were from the correct category. Experiment 2 replicated these target recognition effects while also demonstrating that they do not extend to associative recognition performance. Experiment 3 again replicated the target recognition pattern, while also examining participants’ metacognitive recognition judgments. Participants correctly judged that their memory would be better after small than after large errors, but incorrectly believed that making any errors would be detrimental, relative to study-only. Overall, the data are inconsistent with the error-correction hypothesis; small, within-category errors produced better recognition than large, cross-category errors. Alternative theories, based on elaborative encoding and motivated learning, are considered.

EXPRESS: Explaining the association between repetition priming and source memory: No evidence for a contribution of recognition or fluency

In a conjoint memory task (measuring repetition priming, recognition memory, source memory), items recognized as previously studied and receiving correct source decisions also tend to show a greater magnitude of the repetition priming effect. These associations have been explained as arising from a single memory system or signal, rather than multiple distinct ones (Lange, Berry, & Hollins, 2020). In the present work, we examine whether the association between priming and source memory can alternatively be explained as being driven by recognition or fluency. We first reproduced the basic priming-source association (Experiment 1). In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that the association persisted even when the task was modified so that overt and covert recognition judgments were precluded. In Experiment 4, the association was again present even though fluency (as measured by identification response time) could not influence the source decision, although the association was notably weaker. These findings suggest that the association between priming and source memory is not attributable to a contribution of recognition or fluency; instead, the findings are consistent with a single-system account in which a common memory signal drives responding.

Does source memory exist for unrecognized items?

In episodic memory research, there is a debate concerning whether decision-making in recognition and source memory is better explained by models than assume discrete cognitive states, or by models that assume continuous underlying strengths. One aspect in which these classes of models differ is their predictions regarding the ability to retrieve contextual details (or source details) of an experienced event, given that the event itself is not recognized. Discrete state models predict that when items are unrecognized, source retrieval is not possible and only guess responses can be elicited. In contrast, models assuming continuous strengths predict that it is possible to retrieve the source of unrecognized items (albeit with low accuracy). Empirically, there have been numerous studies reporting either chance accuracy or above-chance accuracy for source memory in the absence of recognition. For instance, studies presenting recognition and source judgments for the same item in immediate succession have revealed chance-level accuracy, while studies presenting a block of recognition judgments followed by a block of source judgments have revealed slightly above-chance accuracy. In the present investigation, data from two novel experiments involving multiple design manipulations were investigated using a hierarchical Bayesian signal detection model. Across most conditions it was shown that source accuracy for unrecognized items was slightly above chance. It is suggested that findings of a null effect in the prior literature may be attributable to design elements that hinder source memory as a whole, and to high degrees of uncertainty in the participant-level source data when conditioned on unrecognized items.

Neural Sensitivity to Mutual Information in Intermediate-Complexity Face Features Changes during Childhood

One way in which face recognition develops during infancy and childhood is with regard to the visual information that contributes most to recognition judgments. Adult face recognition depends on critical features spanning a hierarchy of complexity, including low-level, intermediate, and high-level visual information. To date, the development of adult-like information biases for face recognition has focused on low-level features, which are computationally well-defined but low in complexity, and high-level features, which are high in complexity, but not defined precisely. To complement this existing literature, we examined the development of children’s neural responses to intermediate-level face features characterized using mutual information. Specifically, we examined children’s and adults’ sensitivity to varying levels of category diagnosticity at the P100 and N170 components. We found that during middle childhood, sensitivity to mutual information shifts from early components to later ones, which may indicate a critical restructuring of face recognition mechanisms that takes place over several years. This approach provides a useful bridge between the study of low- and high-level visual features for face recognition and suggests many intriguing questions for further investigation.

Montefinese M, Vinson D, Ambrosini E. Pupil response to false memory modulated by feature similarity (PrePrint)

Differences in pupil dilation are observed for studied compared to new items in recognition memory. According to cognitive load theory, this effect reflects the greater cognitive demands of retrieving contextual information from study phase. Pupil dilation can also occur when new items conceptually related to old ones are erroneously recognized as old, but the aspects of similarity that modulate false memory and related pupil responses remain unclear. We investigated this issue by manipulating the degree of featural similarity between new (unstudied) and old (studied) concepts in an old/new recognition task. We found that new concepts with high similarity were mistakenly identified as old and had greater pupil dilation than those with low similarity, suggesting that pupil dilation reflects the strength of evidence on which recognition judgments are based and, importantly, greater locus coeruleus and prefrontal activity determined by the higher degree of retrieval monitoring involved in recognizing these items.