Why do we argue about science? Exploring the psychological antecedents of rejection of science

<p>Science is recognised and accepted as an important tool for understanding the world in which we live, yet some people hold beliefs that go against the best available scientific evidence. For example, many people believe human-caused climate change is not occurring, or that vaccines are ineffective and dangerous. Previous research has investigated a range of possible drivers of this ‘rejection of science’ (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013), including ignorance, distrust of scientists, and ideological motivations. The studies in this thesis extend this line of inquiry, focusing first on the role of perceptions of scientific agreement. I report experimental evidence that people base their beliefs on ‘what they think scientists think’ (Study 1). However, an analysis of longitudinal data (Study 2) suggests that our personal beliefs may also skew our perceptions of scientific agreement. While the results of Study 1 and Study 2 somewhat conflict, they do converge on one finding: perceptions of consensus alone do not fully explain rejection of science. In the remainder of the thesis I cast a wider net, examining how ideological beliefs are linked to rejection of science. Study 3 draws on social media data to reveal that political ideology is associated with rejection of science in the context of who people choose to follow on the platform Twitter. A final set of studies (4, 5, and 6) examine the role of two motivational antecedents of political ideology, Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), in rejection of science across five publicly debated issues. I also explore several potential mediators which might explain these effects. I report, for the first time, that RWA and SDO predict rejection of science across a range of issues and one mediator emerges as a consistent link: distrust of scientists. People who are less opposed to authoritarian (RWA) or hierarchical (SDO) values are less trusting of scientists and, in turn, more likely to reject specific scientific findings. I discuss potential strategies to address or circumvent this ideologically-motivated distrust of science. Taken as whole, this thesis extends our understanding of why people disagree with an established scientific consensus on socially important issues. Knowledge of the scientific consensus matters, but our deeper beliefs about society can also draw us closer to, or push us further from evidence-based conclusions.</p>

Why do we argue about science? Exploring the psychological antecedents of rejection of science

<p>Science is recognised and accepted as an important tool for understanding the world in which we live, yet some people hold beliefs that go against the best available scientific evidence. For example, many people believe human-caused climate change is not occurring, or that vaccines are ineffective and dangerous. Previous research has investigated a range of possible drivers of this ‘rejection of science’ (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013), including ignorance, distrust of scientists, and ideological motivations. The studies in this thesis extend this line of inquiry, focusing first on the role of perceptions of scientific agreement. I report experimental evidence that people base their beliefs on ‘what they think scientists think’ (Study 1). However, an analysis of longitudinal data (Study 2) suggests that our personal beliefs may also skew our perceptions of scientific agreement. While the results of Study 1 and Study 2 somewhat conflict, they do converge on one finding: perceptions of consensus alone do not fully explain rejection of science. In the remainder of the thesis I cast a wider net, examining how ideological beliefs are linked to rejection of science. Study 3 draws on social media data to reveal that political ideology is associated with rejection of science in the context of who people choose to follow on the platform Twitter. A final set of studies (4, 5, and 6) examine the role of two motivational antecedents of political ideology, Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), in rejection of science across five publicly debated issues. I also explore several potential mediators which might explain these effects. I report, for the first time, that RWA and SDO predict rejection of science across a range of issues and one mediator emerges as a consistent link: distrust of scientists. People who are less opposed to authoritarian (RWA) or hierarchical (SDO) values are less trusting of scientists and, in turn, more likely to reject specific scientific findings. I discuss potential strategies to address or circumvent this ideologically-motivated distrust of science. Taken as whole, this thesis extends our understanding of why people disagree with an established scientific consensus on socially important issues. Knowledge of the scientific consensus matters, but our deeper beliefs about society can also draw us closer to, or push us further from evidence-based conclusions.</p>

Uniquely disgusting? Physiological disgust and attitudes toward GM food and other food and health technologies

Despite scientific consensus that genetically modified (GM) food is safe to eat, the American public remains skeptical. This study (N=73) investigates the proposed role of disgust in driving opposition to GM food, which is debated in extant literature. Using physiological measures of disgust, alongside self-report measures, this study suggests that disgust plays a role in driving skepticism toward GM food, but not other food and health technologies. We further discuss the possible influence of risk sensitivity and perceptions of unnaturalness on attitudes toward novel science.

The Effects of Consensus Messages and the Importance of a Pre-Test: A Comment on Chinn and Hart (2021)

Chinn and Hart (2021) argue that their experiment on the effects of communicating the scientific consensus on climate change revealed “mixed” and “inconsistent findings”. We note that Chinn and Hart (2021) provide clear and consistent evidence that the scientific consensus message has positive indirect effects on climate beliefs, attitudes, and support for public action, and that these effects are more pronounced among conservatives (as predicted). Importantly, however, the authors’ claim that these positive findings might simply be the result of an experimental design choice: the use of a pre-test of the dependent variables. Here we argue that no convincing evidence is provided for the conclusion that pre-tests should not be used. In fact, contrary to the authors’ recommendation, we make the case that the inclusion of a pre-test in randomized controlled designs increases power and precision. Furthermore, we point to its central importance for the ability to capture and evaluate the Gateway Belief Model’s (GBM) key predictions about changes in public attitudes.

Is the Earth Crying Wolf? Exploring Knowledge Source and Certainty in High School Students’ Analysis of Global Warming News

The marked contrast between the scientific consensus on global warming and public beliefs indicates a need to research how high schoolers, as future citizens, engage with and make meaning from news articles on such topics. In the case of socioscientific issues (SSIs) such as global warming, students’ acquisition of knowledge from the news is mediated by their epistemic understandings of the nature of science (NOS) and use of informal reasoning in evaluating claims, evidence, and sources. This exploratory qualitative study examined twelve U.S. high school students’ understandings, opinions, and epistemic beliefs concerning global warming knowledge. Researchers examined microgenetic changes as students discussed global warming during semi-structured interviews and a close reading of global warming news texts. Although results showed that most students could articulate a working concept of global warming, in follow-up questions, a subset offered personal opinions that differed from or contradicted their previously stated understandings. Meanwhile, students who offered opinions consistent with the scientific consensus often argued that the dangers of global warming were exaggerated by politicians and scientists who wished to profit from the issue. This study suggests a need for more explicit focus on NOS and scientific news literacy in curricula, as well as further research into the interplay between epistemic beliefs and the informal reasoning students use to negotiate diverse sources of SSI knowledge—from the classroom to the news media and public life.

«INFORMOLOGY» IN DISCIPLINARY RESEARCH: TERMS AND ESSENTIAL APPROACHES

The purpose of the article is to identify essential approaches to understanding informology and the practice of using «informological» terminology in disciplinary research. The research methodology is based on a set of general scientific methods of generalization, systematization and forecasting. Methodology. Research methods used: analysis of the documentary flow of publications in which the subject or object is informology or related problematic aspects, the method of analogy to find common and separate in the approaches of researchers to the essence of informology, hypothetical analysis allowed to draw conclusions about scientific consensus in among Ukrainian scientists on informology as a «science of information». The scientific novelty is to identify modern approaches to understanding informology in disciplinary research, substantiate the conclusion that there is a scientific consensus in the understanding of informology as a science of information while not presenting research that would clearly outline the substantive basis of informology and justify the list of disciplines generalizing science. Conclusions. In the domestic scientific discourse, informology is considered to be a generalizing science that covers the study of all aspects related to information and information processes. There is a scientific consensus in the disciplinary community regarding this understanding. The existence of informology as a theoretical and methodological basis in the system of scientific research is characterized by the factual absence of the representation in the scientific discourse of its subject-content bases. The considered approaches, considerations, and terminological applications related to «informology» do not highlight its role as a generalizing science for disciplines that use the information approach, do not reveal conceptual interdisciplinary theories, concepts, and models proposed on its basis within the information approach and do not present the epistemological potential of informology. Keywords: informology, information sciences, information approach, scientific consensus, terminology.

Public Conceptions of Scientific Consensus

Despite decades of concerted efforts to communicate to the public on important scientific issues pertaining to the environment and public health, gaps between public acceptance and the scientific consensus on these issues remain stubborn. One strategy for dealing with this shortcoming has been to focus on the existence of the scientific consensus. Recent science communication research has added support to this general idea, though the interpretation of these studies and their generalizability remains a matter of contention. In this paper, we describe results of a large qualitative interview study on different models of scientific consensus and the relationship between such models and trust of science, finding that familiarity with scientific consensus is rarer than might be expected. These results suggest that consensus messaging strategies may not be effective.

The theory of the chain fountain revisited

We analyze the chain fountain effect-the chain siphoning when falling from a container onto the floor. We argue that the main reason for this effect is the inertia of the chain, whereas the momentum received by the beads of the chain from the bottom of the container (typically called “kicks”) plays no significant role. The inertia of the chain leads to an effect similar to pulling the chain over a pulley placed up in the air, above the container. In another model (the so called “scientific consensus”), it was assumed that up to half of the mechanical work done by the tension in the chain may be wasted when transformed into kinetic energy during the pickup process. This prevented the chain to rise unless the energy transfer in the pickup process is improved by the “kicks” from the bottom of the container. Here we show that the “kicks” are unnecessary and both, energy and momentum are conserved-as they should be, in the absence of dissipation-if one properly considers the tension and the movement of the chain. By doing so, we conclude that the velocity acquired by the chain is high enough to produce the fountain effect. Simple experiments validate our model and certain configurations produce the highest chain fountain, although “kicks” are impossible.