Identification of the Conditions to Establish the Venture Capital Fund for Technology Innovation Activities in Vietnam

The lack of capital for technology innovation has always been a dilemma for businesses because of the need for large capital for risky technology innovation activities. Venture investment is one of the solutions for the challenge of capital issue. It is considered as a “gamble” to gain or loss with full of risk. In Vietnam, despite being studied since the 90s of the last century, the issue of establishing venture capital fund and venture investment is still a topical topic. This paper highlighted the roles of venture capital fund for technology innovation activities as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions to establish these venture capital funds in Vietnam such as a perfect market economy, willing venture investors, and available institution of the stock market, etc. From that, the paper identified the insufficient elements for the establishment of venture capital fund in Vietnam.

Who Should Regulate Disruptive Technology?

The primary concern of the present paper is the cost of acquiring information by judges and legislators in the process of regulating new technologies. The paper distinguishes between risky and uncertain applications of technology. A risky technology poses an obvious risk, and the problem before the regulator is one of comparing cost and benefit. We argue that the judiciary, which acquires information gratis from litigants, is better suited to the regulation of risky technologies. Uncertain technologies, on the other hand, can be harmful in ways which cannot be foreseen at the time of the technological innovation. Cost and benefit are incalculable; regulation must instead be based on subjective preferences about the degree of uncertainty that society should tolerate. Legislative law-making is designed with a view to aggregating subjective preferences. Accordingly, uncertain technologies should be regulated through statute.

Public Participation and Norm Formation for Risky Technology: Adaptive Governance of Solar-Radiation Management

As the international community comes to grips with climate destabilization, it has begun to evaluate potentially risky technologies, such as geoengineering, to mitigate the effects of warming. The geoengineering technology known as solar-radiation management (srm) poses many risks. There is also great uncertainty about whether society will decide to deploy srm in the future. Managing these risks and uncertainties requires adaptive governance that will be responsive to new knowledge and changing social systems. We analyse the dimensions of public participation and norm-formation mechanisms of current srm-related legal regimes and governance proposals. We find that there is a need for the social sciences, including legal and governance scholars, to engage with the theoretical and pragmatic challenges of engaging diverse and vulnerable publics fairly and efficiently.

Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard

This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact on transfers is much more utility dependent. (JEL D81, D82, D86, G22)