Stabilizing the framework of SAPO-34 zeolite toward long-term methanol-to-olefins conversion

As a commercial MTO catalyst, SAPO-34 zeolite exhibits excellent recyclability probably due to its intrinsic good hydrothermal stability. However, the structural dynamic changes of SAPO-34 catalyst induced by hydrocarbon pool (HP) species and the water formed during the MTO conversion as well as its long-term stability after continuous regenerations are rarely investigated and poorly understood. Herein, the dynamic changes of SAPO-34 framework during the MTO conversion were identified by 1D 27Al, 31P MAS NMR, and 2D 31P-27Al HETCOR NMR spectroscopy. The breakage of T-O-T bonds in SAPO-34 catalyst during long-term continuous regenerations in the MTO conversion could be efficiently suppressed by pre-coking. The combination of catalyst pre-coking and water co-feeding is established to be an efficient strategy to promote the catalytic efficiency and long-term stability of SAPO-34 catalysts in the commercial MTO processes, also sheds light on the development of other high stable zeolite catalyst in the commercial catalysis.

Classifying the Epicurean Goods

Scholars have paid little attention to the classifications among goods that Epicureans posit. This paper remedies that deficiency. I argue for three claims. First, if we take instrumental goods to be those that are a means or causally lead to the intrinsic good and we take constitutive goods to be those that are part of or amount to the intrinsic good, then the Epicureans probably took reverence for a wise man and wisdom to be instrumental goods but self-sufficiency and phronesis to be constitutive goods. Second, Epicurean personal goods are those that produce eudaimonia but are firmly up to us to achieve rather than owing to chance. Third, Epicurean immortal goods are those that bring about divinely resilient tranquility for those who cultivate them. I then show how positing these classifications enables the Epicureans to claim that godlike happiness is achievable through our own efforts no matter the external circumstances.

Freedom and Animal Welfare

The keeping of captive animals in zoos and aquariums has long been controversial. Many take freedom to be a crucial part of animal welfare and, on these grounds, criticise all forms of animal captivity as harmful to animal welfare, regardless of their provisions. Here, we analyse what it might mean for freedom to matter to welfare, distinguishing between the role of freedom as an intrinsic good, valued for its own sake and an instrumental good, its value arising from the increased ability to provide other important resources. Too often, this debate is conducted through trading intuitions about what matters for animals. We argue for the need for the collection of comparative welfare data about wild and captive animals in order to settle the issue. Discovering more about the links between freedom and animal welfare will then allow for more empirically informed ethical decisions regarding captive animals.

Consequentialism and Promises

I explore the debate about whether consequentialist theories can adequately accommodate the moral force of promissory obligation. I outline a straightforward act consequentialist account grounded in the value of satisfying expectations, and I raise and assess three objections to this account: that it counterintuitively predicts that certain promises should be broken when common-sense morality insists that they should be kept, that the account is circular, and Michael Cholbi’s argument that this account problematically implies that promise-making is frequently obligatory. I then discuss alternative act consequentialist accounts, including Philip Pettit’s suggestion that promise-keeping is an intrinsic good and Michael Smith’s agent-relative account. I outline Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialist account of promissory obligation and raise a challenge for it. I conclude that appeals to intuitions about cases will not settle the dispute, and that consequentialists and their critics must instead engage in substantive debate about the nature and stringency of promissory obligation.

What Should a Consequentialist Promote?

Whether we choose to be act or rule consequentialists, to maximize value or be satisfied with a less demanding requirement, and even whether we require impartiality in our values, we need to decide what set of values we should commit ourselves to. In this chapter I will ask what intrinsic good or goods a consequentialist should value. I will start with a general point: what reasons are there for being a value monist rather than a value pluralist? Then, I will ask whether consequentialists should be concerned with what is good for someone or rather with what is good “for the world.” To answer this, I will discuss how best to understand the notion of welfare. Finally, I will consider different welfarist theories and suggest a possible candidate for the most promising one.

Truth Matters: Living in Dangerous Times - Aquinas on the Virtue of Truth-Telling

Current political and social climate seems to have as a presupposition the view that truth-telling has a merely instrumental value. This paper will explore Thomas Aquinas’ writing on truth and truth-telling, arguing that truth-telling is an intrinsic good, a human virtue and a component of human flourishing. In Aquinas’ view the virtue of truth-telling is a satellite virtue within the cardinal virtue of justice, and as such imperative for the flourishing of human society.

Nonprofits as Schools for Democracy: The Justifications for Organizational Democracy Within Nonprofit Organizations

Nonprofit organizations are often claimed to be schools of democracy: “that produce citizens able and ready to participate in society” (as stated by Dodge and Ospina in Nonprofits as “schools of democracy”: A comparative case study of two environmental organizations, 2016, page 479). This claim is predicated the external role nonprofits play in producing democracy, particularly by engendering civic action. In contrast, this article promotes nonprofits’ internal organizing processes to produce democracy within nonprofits themselves. Drawing on the workplace democracy literature, we explore three main justifications for workplace democracy: consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethics. Rather than viewing workplace democracy as an extrinsic good—based solely on consequences external to the organization—we argue that it should be considered an intrinsic good, valuable in and of itself. We, therefore, argue for a broadened imaginary for how nonprofits are managed, that include the internal organizational processes and widening of the social mission of nonprofit organization for greater democracy and freedom, based on good work.

Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom: A Critique of the Little Alex Problem

A common objection to moral enhancement is that it would undermine our moral freedom and that this is a bad thing because moral freedom is a great good. Michael Hauskeller has defended this view on a couple of occasions using an arresting thought experiment called the “Little Alex” problem. In this chapter, I reconstruct the argument Hauskeller derives from this thought experiment and subject it to critical scrutiny. I claim that the argument ultimately fails because (a) it assumes that moral freedom is an intrinsic good when, in fact, it is more likely to be an axiological catalyst; and (b) there are reasons to think that moral enhancement does not undermine moral freedom.