EU cybersecurity and cyber diplomacy

Over the last decades cybersecurity has become a cornerstone of European digital development. Alongside with the diffusion of information and communication technologies and the deepening (as well as widening) of the European Union, the initial narrow and sectoral data security policies have expanded into a comprehensive cybersecurity framework addressing issues from resilient infrastructure and technological sovereignty, through tackling cybercrime, to cyber defence capabilities and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. In this complex web of interrelated policies a relative newcomer at the European Union (EU) level is cyber diplomacy. Sometimes also called public diplomacy 2.0, it factors into the cross-border connectivity of cyberspace and reflects a shift in international relations where the lines between external and internal policies, military and civilian domains are blurred. However, the term cyber diplomacy is fluid and it is not well understood which topics should be under its “umbrella”, in particular in relation to cybersecurity, where it seems to be linked the most. This article aims to map existing and proposed instruments that make up the EU’s arsenal in this broad context to answer the following questions: what is cyber diplomacy and how is it related to the EU cybersecurity? Is cyber diplomacy in the EU becoming something in its own right as a distinct set of tools to secure the EU policy objectives?

Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) cases and India: affronting regulatory autonomy or indicting capricious state behaviour?

Purpose The dominant narrative in the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system is that it enables powerful corporations to encroach upon the regulatory power of developing countries aimed at pursuing compelling public interest objectives. The example of Phillip Morris, the tobacco giant, suing Uruguay’s public health measures is cited as the most significant example to prove this thesis. The other side of the story that States abuse their public power to undermine the protected rights of foreign investors does not get much attention. Design/methodology/approach This paper reviews all the ISDS cases that India has lost to ascertain the reason why these claims were brought against India in the first place. The approach of the paper is to study these ISDS cases to find out whether these cases arose due to abuse of the State’s public power or affronted India’s regulatory autonomy. Findings Against this global context, this paper studies the ISDS claims brought against India, one of the highest respondent-State in ISDS, to show that they arose due to India’s capricious behaviour. Analysis of these cases reveals that India acted in bad faith and abused its public power by either amending laws retroactively or by scrapping licences without following due process or going back on specific and written assurances that induced investors to invest. In none of these cases, the foreign investors challenged India’s regulatory measures aimed at advancing the genuine public interest. The absence of a “Phillip Morris moment” in India’s ISDS story is a stark reminder that one should give due weight to the equally compelling narrative that ISDS claims are also a result of abuse of public power by States. Originality/value The originality value of this paper arises from the fact that this is the first comprehensive study of ISDS cases brought against India and provides full documentation within the larger global context of rising ISDS cases. The paper contributes to the debate on international investment law by showing that in the case of India most of the ISDS cases brought were due to India abusing its public power and was not an affront on India’s regulatory autonomy.

Tris-(2-pyridyl)-pyrazolyl Borate Zinc(II) Complexes: Synthesis, DNA/Protein Binding and In Vitro Cytotoxicity Studies

Zn(II) complexes bearing tris[3-(2-pyridyl)-pyrazolyl] borate (Tppy) ligand (1–3) was synthesized and examined by spectroscopic and analytical tools. Mononuclear [TppyZnCl] (1) has a Zn(II) centre with one arm (pyrazolyl-pyridyl) dangling outside the coordination sphere which is a novel finding in TppyZn(II) chemistry. In complex [TppyZn(H2O)][BF4] (2) hydrogen bonding interaction of aqua moiety stabilizes the dangling arm. In addition, solution state behaviour of complex 1 confirms the tridentate binding mode and reactivity studies show the exogenous axial substituents used to form the [TppyZnN3] (3). The complexes (1–3) were tested for their ability to bind with Calf thymus (CT) DNA and Bovine serum albumin (BSA) wherein they revealed to exhibit good binding constant values with both the biomolecules in the order of 104–105 M−1. The intercalative binding mode with CT DNA was confirmed from the UV-Visible absorption, viscosity, and ethidium bromide (EB) DNA displacement studies. Further, the complexes were tested for in vitro cytotoxic ability on four triple-negative breast cancer (TNBC) cell lines (MDA-MB-231, MDA-MB-468, HCC1937, and Hs 578T). All three complexes (1–3) exhibited good IC50 values (6.81 to 16.87 μM for 24 h as seen from the MTS assay) results which indicated that these complexes were found to be potential anticancer agents against the TNBC cells.

Extended Analysis of a Valve-Controlled System with Multi-Chamber Actuator

This paper outlines an extended analysis on how multi-chamber actuators can improve the efficiency of valve-controlled systems. Resistive control is a major source of energy losses in valve-controlled systems that share the same pump to drive multiple loads. By combining different chambers, the load on multi-chamber actuators can be transformed into different pressure and flow rate levels. This allows the adaptation of its load to the loads on other actuators. This can lead to a reduction of resistive control energy losses that occur between pump and actuators when driven simultaneously. As a case study to highlight how the system efficiency can be improved, a load sensing system with a conventional and a multi-chamber actuator is analysed. The equations that describe the system steady state behaviour are presented to evaluate the effect of the load transformations on the system efficiency. A disadvantage of such architecture is the fact that load transformations result in different actuator speeds. To reduce this effect, a compensation factor for the command signal to the proportional valve is presented. The highlight from this paper is the potential for efficiency improvement enabled by the adoption of multi-chamber actuators in a valve-controlled architecture. Further research is required for the selection of number of chambers and their areas since they directly affect the system efficiency.

Non Conformity to Norms: Why Do States Proliferate in Opposition to Well Established and Powerful Non-Proliferation Norms

<p>Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons and of these only three have acquired them in the past 40 years. The primary reason for this has been the establishment of a powerful nuclear non-proliferation regime and its associated norms. The powerful influence of both the regime and the resulting norms on state behaviour is unquestionable. However a limited amount of state proliferation continues and some states’ behaviour suggests that they either reject, or believe that they are outside of the influence of the regime and its norms. My study is looking at the problem of non-conformity to the non-proliferation norm to see why it occurs. The issue is specifically a nuclear one however non-conformity to norms has wider implications in the study of international relations (IR). Regimes and norms clearly do not exist in a vacuum but operate within an international social environment. This nuclear issue remains a central consideration for state foreign policy and hence has justified extensive examination in the field of IR. The intellectually and ethically complex issues that surround access to this technology were acknowledged from its devastating baptism in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. International regulation was seen as the most appropriate form of control of nuclear weapons. This was in part due to the potential consequence of the misuse and the impact of accidents transcending national boundaries. This ultimate destructive capability has only been in the hands of a few states and the dissemination and control of this capability has been contentious from the day it was first used. Initially its power came from its potential to completely dominate militarily. As soon as the second country gained the same capability it became a lot more complicated. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons is such that any future war that saw their use could result in the annihilation of the human species. The Cold War and its extreme vertical nuclear proliferation actualised this fear. Nuclear technologies dual purpose functionality, of both peaceful power generation and the creation of a military nuclear capability make for a complex situation. There is an obvious power imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots and a self protective desire to stop or at least limit the number of countries attempting to join the ‘nuclear club’. Both realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are able to explain, in part, conformity and non conformity to regimes and their associated norms within today’s social environment. In this study I will use a social constructivist approach, which is based on the outcomes of persuasion, identification and social conformity, to see if it can add to the current explanations of state nuclear proliferation.</p>

Non Conformity to Norms: Why Do States Proliferate in Opposition to Well Established and Powerful Non-Proliferation Norms

<p>Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons and of these only three have acquired them in the past 40 years. The primary reason for this has been the establishment of a powerful nuclear non-proliferation regime and its associated norms. The powerful influence of both the regime and the resulting norms on state behaviour is unquestionable. However a limited amount of state proliferation continues and some states’ behaviour suggests that they either reject, or believe that they are outside of the influence of the regime and its norms. My study is looking at the problem of non-conformity to the non-proliferation norm to see why it occurs. The issue is specifically a nuclear one however non-conformity to norms has wider implications in the study of international relations (IR). Regimes and norms clearly do not exist in a vacuum but operate within an international social environment. This nuclear issue remains a central consideration for state foreign policy and hence has justified extensive examination in the field of IR. The intellectually and ethically complex issues that surround access to this technology were acknowledged from its devastating baptism in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. International regulation was seen as the most appropriate form of control of nuclear weapons. This was in part due to the potential consequence of the misuse and the impact of accidents transcending national boundaries. This ultimate destructive capability has only been in the hands of a few states and the dissemination and control of this capability has been contentious from the day it was first used. Initially its power came from its potential to completely dominate militarily. As soon as the second country gained the same capability it became a lot more complicated. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons is such that any future war that saw their use could result in the annihilation of the human species. The Cold War and its extreme vertical nuclear proliferation actualised this fear. Nuclear technologies dual purpose functionality, of both peaceful power generation and the creation of a military nuclear capability make for a complex situation. There is an obvious power imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots and a self protective desire to stop or at least limit the number of countries attempting to join the ‘nuclear club’. Both realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are able to explain, in part, conformity and non conformity to regimes and their associated norms within today’s social environment. In this study I will use a social constructivist approach, which is based on the outcomes of persuasion, identification and social conformity, to see if it can add to the current explanations of state nuclear proliferation.</p>

Low-Dimensional Architectures in Isomeric cis-PtCl2{Ph2PCH2N(Ar)CH2PPh2} Complexes Using Regioselective-N(Aryl)-Group Manipulation

The solid-state behaviour of two series of isomeric, phenol-substituted, aminomethylphosphines, as the free ligands and bound to PtII, have been extensively studied using single crystal X-ray crystallography. In the first library, isomeric diphosphines of the type Ph2PCH2N(Ar)CH2PPh2 [1a–e; Ar = C6H3(Me)(OH)] and, in the second library, amide-functionalised, isomeric ligands Ph2PCH2N{CH2C(O)NH(Ar)}CH2PPh2 [2a–e; Ar = C6H3(Me)(OH)], were synthesised by reaction of Ph2PCH2OH and the appropriate amine in CH3OH, and isolated as colourless solids or oils in good yield. The non-methyl, substituted diphosphines Ph2PCH2N{CH2C(O)NH(Ar)}CH2PPh2 [2f, Ar = 3-C6H4(OH); 2g, Ar = 4-C6H4(OH)] and Ph2PCH2N(Ar)CH2PPh2 [3, Ar = 3-C6H4(OH)] were also prepared for comparative purposes. Reactions of 1a–e, 2a–g, or 3 with PtCl2(η4-cod) afforded the corresponding square-planar complexes 4a–e, 5a–g, and 6 in good to high isolated yields. All new compounds were characterised using a range of spectroscopic (1H, 31P{1H}, FT–IR) and analytical techniques. Single crystal X-ray structures have been determined for 1a, 1b∙CH3OH, 2f∙CH3OH, 2g, 3, 4b∙(CH3)2SO, 4c∙CHCl3, 4d∙½Et2O, 4e∙½CHCl3∙½CH3OH, 5a∙½Et2O, 5b, 5c∙¼H2O, 5d∙Et2O, and 6∙(CH3)2SO. The free phenolic group in 1b∙CH3OH, 2f∙CH3OH,2g, 4b∙(CH3)2SO, 5a∙½Et2O, 5c∙¼H2O, and 6∙(CH3)2SO exhibits various intra- or intermolecular O–H∙∙∙X (X = O, N, P, Cl) hydrogen contacts leading to different packing arrangements.

Technology

This chapter considers factors that may afford non-state actors like terrorists or extremists in the cyber field an opportunity to access offensive cyber means and how this threat might be best managed. It acknowledges that other terrorism-related areas identify a risk in focusing too narrowly on the technology, rather than dealing with motivations and intentions effectively. Similarly, recommendations from law enforcement authorities include preventing criminals from becoming involved in the first place. The main thrust of this chapter is on solutions and minimizing opportunities for violence from occurring rather than countering extremism itself. The concept of so-called ‘cyber terrorism’ is examined, including current perceptions on the degree of terrorist access to offensive cyber means. Several factors that could affect, to varying degrees, such proliferation of tools and techniques include the following: 1. Rising complexity and vulnerabilities in the cyber domain; 2. Maturing skills; 3. The nexus with criminal groups and hacktivists; 4. Levels of resilience; 5. Media exposure; and 6. International negotiations on state behaviour vis-à-vis cyber weapon proliferation.

Getting Beyond Norms

In recent years, countries have become increasingly concerned about the immediate and future threats to their critical services and infrastructures that could result from the misuse of information and communications technologies (ICTs). As such, countries have placed the development of normative standards guiding state behaviour in cyberspace at the top of their foreign policy agendas. Yet, despite broad international consensus regarding the basic principles to limit the misuse of ICTs in the digital age and to constrain state behaviour, the key tenets have been consistently violated. All evidence suggests that states are not following their own doctrines of restraint, and that each disruptive and destructive attack further destabilizes our future. States have turned a blind eye and have shirked their responsibility for curbing or halting cyberattacks originating from their own territories. Disruption or damage (or both) of critical infrastructures that provide services to the public has become customary practice—the ‘new normal’. And this intentional misuse of ICTs against critical infrastructures and services has great potential to lead to misperception, escalation, and even conflict. This chapter offers five standards of care that can be used to ‘test’ individual states’ true commitment to the international norms of behaviour. Only with a concerted and coordinated effort across the global community will it be possible to change the new normal of ‘anything goes’ and move forward to ensure the future safety and security of the Internet and Internet-based infrastructures.

An experimental study of the temperature evolution of a single fin submerged in a phase changing material during melting at different heat fluxes

An experimental setup has been designed to study a single cylindrical fin placed in a cylindrical enclosure filled with phase changing material (PCM). The heat flux to the fin is measured at the top of the fin. The temperature evolution at different fin heights is measured by thermocouples placed internally in the fin. The evolution of these temperatures has been studied for different heat fluxes. This provides insight in the contribution of the different fin heights to the total heat transfer to the PCM during the different stages of the melting process. As such they can be used to assess the effectiveness of the fin over its length. After approximately 6h, the fin temperature stabilizes during melting. Due to the temperature drop over the fin, the bottom temperature reached is significantly lower than the temperature at the top and the contribution of this lower part to the total heat transfer is lower as well. For heat fluxes higher than 3805±75 W/m2, the steady-state temperatures at fin locations in contact with the melting PCM are similar. For low heat fluxes, this steady-state temperature is not reached during a 12h experiment. Longer experiments are thus needed to study the steady-state behaviour at these lower heat fluxes.