An Ode to ODA against all Odds? A Novel Game-Theoretical and Empirical Reappraisal of the Terrorism-Aid Nexus

The present inquiry revisits the influence of the fourth religious wave of modern terrorism on the allocation of official development assistance (ODA). The theoretical framework is predicated first on comprehensive review of the pertinent literature on the nexus between political instability and foreign aid, augmented by the assessment of Central Intelligence Agency declassified documents and Congressional Service Reports. Based on the systematic review of the sources, the study puts forward a novel dynamic differential game theory model, which enables derivation of the scenarios for foreign aid allocation. The study finds that despite dominance of geopolitical and/or commercial interests in the allocation of aid, high incidence of terrorist attacks does not lead to less development aid, but rather catalyzes it. Subsequent empirical analysis of a dataset with 121 developing and transition economies spanning between 1970 and 2016 reveals that terrorism incidents, level of political rights, and the War on Terror had a statistically significant positive long-run and negative short-run effect on the level of foreign aid commitment of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development member states. The growth rate of foreign aid in the developing countries with a predominantly Muslim population has been systematically 0.1 to 0.85 percent greater than in non-Muslim countries. Subsequent assessment of the security bias in the allocation of aid indicates that re-securitization of aid since 1998 has led to weak diversion of aid commitment from areas with fewer terrorism incidents to jurisdictions with a greater frequency of terrorist attacks.

AUTOMATIC METHOD DETERMINATION OF PARAMETERS STRATEGY OF DIVERGENCE OF VESSELS BY THEIR COURSES CHANGE

In the publication is specified, that providing of safe divergence of vessels at sailing in the straitened waters is one of most the issue of the day of accident-free of navigation. Therefore, straitened districts of sailing with especially intensive motion for the control of process of navigation by the stations of traffic control of vessels which for providing of safe divergence of vessels must dispose by modern facilities of warning of collision of vessels, reducing influencing of human factor of operator by the use of methods of automatic determination of strategy of divergence of vessels at their external management. Actuality of development of method of automatic determination of parameters of strategy of divergence of vessels by the change of their courses is determined to these. The analysis of the last achievements and publications is resulted in work, the decision of the considered problem and selection of parts unsolved before is begun in which. It is shown that for the decision of problem of warning of collisions of vessels was used method of nonlinear integral invariance, methods of theory of optimum discrete processes, and also methods of differential game theory. The method of warning of collision of vessels by displacement on a line parallel of way of ship and method of flexible strategies of divergence of vessels got development, allowing to form optimum strategy of divergence of ship with a few dangerous targets taking into account substantial factors. The publication contains analytical dependence of values of courses of deviation of vessels providing their divergence on minimum - possible distance of rapprochement, without taking into account inertia. It is specified, that for optimum of maneuver of divergence is needed, that increases of courses and were minimum, and as the criterion of optimum the sum of their squares is chosen. It is shown that without taking into account inertia of ship at a turn distance of the shortest rapprochement appears less minimum-possible distance on a size which depends on the increase of relative coordinates of vessels in times of turn and relative course of their deviation. Procedure of progressive approximations is offered for the calculation of courses of deviation of vessels taking into account their inertia and the algorithm of calculation of course of deviation is represented. Set by the values by the increases of courses from - 60° to 60°, the courses of deviation of the second ship settle accounts, which the courses of deviation of the first ship taking into account the dynamics of vessels and increase of his course are determined on. Every maneuver of divergence is characterized by the criterion of optimum, thus the maneuver of divergence gets out as optimum, at which the criterion of optimum is minimum. A situation is resulted in the publication, for which the computer imitation program expected the optimum courses of deviation of vessels. By the computer program, playing of maneuver of divergence of vessels with the got courses of deviation was produced.

Conversion of Dual-Use Technology: A Differential Game Analysis under the Civil-Military Integration

Civil-military integration enables the symmetry development of dual-use technologies in the defense and civilian areas. In this paper, we used stochastic differential game theory to build theoretical models of the dual-use technology conversion between a military firm and a civilian firm. The models include three directions of dual-use technology conversion, namely, spin-off, spin-in, and mix. In particular, we incorporate the dynamic development of dual-use technology into the research framework. Our results show that the order of the Pareto optimality results is mix, spin-in, spin-out, including the best effort, the highest revenue, and the most technology value-added. The results also indicate that: (1) Some random interference factors can affect the transfer efforts, such as the coefficient of technological innovation capability and cost coefficients. (2) The military subsidies factor is an inventive mechanism that can promote dual-use transfer from the civilian firm to the military. (3) The military enterprise only earns more than the civilian firm in spin-in. (4) The growth of models in the dual-use technology conversion process faces increased technology uncertainty.

Some questions of differential game theory with phase constraints

Differential game (DG) of guidance-evasion is considered; moreover, its relaxations constructed with due account for priority considerations in the implementation of target set (TS) guidance and phase constraints (PC) validity are considered. We suppose that TS is closed in a natural topology of position space. With respect to the set that defines PC, it is postulated that the sections corresponding to time fixing are closed. For this setting, with the use of program iteration method (PIM), a variant of alternative for some natural (asymmetric) classes of strategies is established. A scheme of relaxation for the game guidance problem with nonclosed (in general case) set defining PC is considered. Under relaxation construction, reasons connected with priority in the implementation of guidance to TS and PC validity are taken into account (the case of asymmetric weakening of conditions of game ending is investigated). A position function is introduced, values of which (with priority correction) play the role of an analogue of least size for neighborhoods of TS and set defining PC under which it is possible to get a guaranteed solution of a relaxed problem of a player interested in approaching with TS while observing PC. It is demonstrated that the value of given function (when fixing the position of the game) is a price of DG for minimax-maximin quality functional which characterizes both the “degree” of approaching with TS and the “degree” of observance of initial PC.

Optimal Solution of a Target Defense Game with Two defenders and a Faster Intrude

A target defense game with two defenders and a faster intruder is solved based on the classic differential game theory. In the game, the intruder seeks to enter a circular target area, while the defenders endeavor to capture it outside of the target. Under the faster intruder assumption, the game has two phases, where the optimal trajectories are straight and curved, respectively. In the second phase, a peculiar phenomenon exists where the intruder moves at the edge of one defender’s capture region, yet this defender cannot force capture. Because of this, the terminal states of the game are singular, therefore the standard method of integrating optimal trajectories from terminal states is not applicable. The way to circumvent this singularity is to solve the optimal trajectories of a two-player game between the intruder and the closer defender, and assemble them with the trajectory of the other defender. The key contribution of this paper is the solution of the intruder-closer-defender subgame against a circular target area. In the vector field of the optimal trajectories, two singular surfaces and a singular point are observed. Each singular surface indicates a discontinuity in the closer defender’s control, while the singular point represents a situation where the target is successfully protected by a single defender. The complete solution of the two-defender game is solved based on the result of the intruder-closer-defender subgame. The proposed solution is verified through a special case where the capture range is zero. This verification also presents a simpler approach of solving the zero capture range problem.

A Framework for Human-Robot-Human Physical Interaction Based on N-Player Game Theory

In order to analyze the complex interactive behaviors between the robot and two humans, this paper presents an adaptive optimal control framework for human-robot-human physical interaction. N-player linear quadratic differential game theory is used to describe the system under study. N-player differential game theory can not be used directly in actual scenerie, since the robot cannot know humans’ control objectives in advance. In order to let the robot know humans’ control objectives, the paper presents an online estimation method to identify unknown humans’ control objectives based on the recursive least squares algorithm. The Nash equilibrium solution of human-robot-human interaction is obtained by solving the coupled Riccati equation. Adaptive optimal control can be achieved during the human-robot-human physical interaction. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated by rigorous theoretical analysis and simulations. The simulation results show that the proposed controller can achieve adaptive optimal control during the interaction between the robot and two humans. Compared with the LQR controller, the proposed controller has more superior performance.

Differential game theory with FPA optimization in multi-area power system

The distribution generation penetration increases due to the increased need of power. These penetration causes problem of frequency deviations. In this paper the in multi-area power system the combination of renewable energy resources is proposed. Here the area 1 & area 2 are thermal power plant. Hydro power generation plant is taken in area-3 & area-4. Renewable energy system is considered in area-5. Here the cyber security attack is taken as change in power in the entire area. This can make the power block out or wrong data entry. Here differential game theory-based problem formulation is done. The PI controller and differential game theory with flower pollination are compared for performance of fast response. The MATLAB 2017b is used for building the areas and algorithm

Modelling cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain using game theory

This work considers cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain, where the manufacturer is taken as the Stackelberg leader, using differential game theory. The distributor and retailer are the first and the second followers, respectively. We introduce the distributor into the traditional manufacturer-retailer channel through his direct involvement in advertising as being incorporated into the non-stochastic Sethi's sales-advertising dynamics. This is used to model the awareness share dynamics in which the distributor and the retailer directly engage in advertising, while the manufacturer bypasses the distributor to subsidise only the retail advertising effort. We consider a subsidised and unsubsidised channel structures, where each structure results in a system of three nonlinear equations, which cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. However, we show that the unique solution to each of the systems exists, provided certain conditions are satisfied. The distributor and the retailer's advertising strategies are developed for both when subsidy is provided and when it is not provided. We also obtain the manufacturer's subsidy rate and the market awareness share for both when retail advertising is subsidised and when it is not subsidised. We observe that with the provision of subsidy, the distributor reduces his advertising effort. However, the resulting increase in the retail advertising effort is larger than the reduction in the distributor's advertising commitment, thus making the channel advertising effort larger with subsidy. It further shows that to avoid being shortchanged, each player should adopt only his optimal strategy or strategies as the case may be.

Channel coordination through quality improvement with brand halo effect

Product quality depends on the quality investment of the manufacturer and quality decisions of the supplier. Therefore, many firms and researchers pay considerable attention to supply quality management. Considering a supply chain that includes two competing suppliers and one manufacturer, this paper investigates the influences of competition and the “brand halo” effect on the quality strategies of channel members, and explores the potential coordinating power of the bilateral participation contract. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper compares and analyzes the quality strategies of all channel members under three different scenarios: (i) decentralized scenario within a subsidy program, (ii) integrated scenario, and (iii) bilateral participation contract. Our results confirm the following results. (1) The manufacturer may not grant a subsidy to the supplier if two final products are highly competitive. (2) Supply chain members are more likely to join the bilateral participation contract if the “brand halo” effect is large. (3) The bilateral participation contract can achieve perfect coordination if the competition is weak or if a transfer payment policy exists.