Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model

The existing literature has made great achievements in technology sharing (licensing patents) contracts, which has defects in the selection of oligopoly models, the setting of innovation subjects, the consideration of product heterogeneity, and production costs. This paper aims to reveal the competitiveness strategies of leaders and followers for innovation, technology sharing, and sharing fees in a Stackelberg market. The three-stage sequential game method is used to achieve the objective. The results are as follows. First, whether an enterprise uses innovation or shares technology is related to the fixed cost of innovation, the return on innovation, and product differentiation. It will hinder innovation activities if the fixed cost of innovation is too high, the return on innovation is too low, or the products are too homogeneous. A relatively low return on innovation makes it possible for the two enterprises to engage in sharing. However, with a relatively high return on innovation, only a high level of product differentiation can ensure technology sharing. Second, the optimal sharing fee is dynamic, showing an upward and then downward trend as the return on innovation grows. Product differentiation has an uncertain impact on the cost. Third, either the leader or the follower is likely to be the optimal bearer of social responsibility depending on the returns on innovation and product differentiation. This study has theoretical significance for optimizing technology-sharing decisions, improving competitiveness for enterprises, and formulating effective industrial policy for the government. And it provides some practical guidance for competition and cooperation between enterprises with technological innovation behavior.

Marginal Utility and Cournot Stability Under Market Entry

This paper introduces into the discussion of the stability of quantity-oligopoly equilibrium, the role that the slope of the marginal utility curve and of market entry in shaping the equilibrium and its stability. It does so by considering inverse multivariate linear demand functions and the notion of stability related to multivariate mean value theorem. The equilibrium cluster of Cournot sellers is determined by the stability dictated by this theorem and the rate of decline of the marginal utility of the product under consideration. Strategic complementarity is found to be the case under product heterogeneity, while the strategic substitutability associated with product homogeneity, induces a modification of Cournot limit theorem.

Trade and Child Labour in SAARC Countries

A review of past studies shows that the studies confine their analysis of trade and child labour in the setting of the trading of homogeneous goods. Hence, the presence study aims to assess the relationship of trade and child labour in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries by incorporating the role of selection of variety or product heterogeneity in child labour demand. In the context of trade in homogeneous and heterogeneous goods, the trade-induced effects are the selection, scale, and technique effects. The panel data analysis is employed to investigate the nexus between trade and child labour over the study period of 1999 to 2019. The results imply that the opening of trade alone will not reduce child labour if it is not accompanied by supportive measures, namely the trade-related effect of child labour, the effect of scale and technique. Therefore, this study suggests that trade liberalization through trade-induced effect would hamper the child labour presence in the emerging markets.