Towards a Sociological Approach to Human Rights Law

An overarching argument of the book, which connects its parts, is an epistemological one: to fully grasp the routine understandings, interpretations and practices that animate human rights law in policing, a sociological approach to law should be explored and experimented with. In sketching out what such an approach might look like, this chapter introduces the three conceptual foundations adopted and outlines the research methods deployed in the book. The first of these is how human rights law comes to be adopted and deployed as ‘vernacular’ beyond traditional legal forums and judicial audiences in order to both legitimate and challenge police power. The second is human rights law as a set of principles and standards that officers are socialized in, and engage in ‘sensemaking’ of, amidst their sub-cultures, everyday routines and organizational demands. The third is how human rights law comes to be ‘practiced’ by officers in specific roles in so far as they are professional actors required to bring a resolution to a specific factual issue through understanding, engaging with and applying human rights law principles and standards. Collectively, these features comprise the book’s sociological approach to human rights law.

Institutions and Scientific Progress

Scientific progress has many facets and can be conceptualized in different ways, for example in terms of problem-solving, of truthlikeness or of growth of knowledge. The main claim of the paper is that the most important prerequisite of scientific progress is the institutionalization of competition and criticism. An institutional framework appropriately channeling competition and criticism is the crucial factor determining the direction and rate of scientific progress, independently on how one might wish to conceptualize scientific progress itself. The main intention is to narrow the divide between traditional philosophy of science and the sociological, economic and political view of science that emphasizes the private interests motivating scientists and the subsequent contingent nature of the enterprise. The aim is to show that although science is a social enterprise taking place in historical time and thus is of a contingent nature, it can and in fact does lead to genuine scientific progress—contrary to the claims of certain sociologists of science and other relativists who standardly stress its social nature, but deny its progressive character. I will first deal with the factual issue by way of introducing the main concepts and mechanisms of modern institutional theory and by applying them to the analysis of the cultural phenomenon that we call modern science. I will then turn to the normative issue: what is the appropriate content of the institutional framework, for scientific progress to emerge and be sustained at which level should it be set and by whom? Addressing this problematic is equivalent to conducting a constitutional debate leading to a Constitution of Science.

The Jury and Pleading

This chapter concentrates on the jury and the history of pleading, which was at the heart of the common-law system. Pleading was the means of defining a factual issue which could be tried by jury. In medieval times pleadings were framed orally, and most legal argument occurred at the pre-trial stage. In the Tudor period this was turned round: pleadings were settled in writing, and legal arguments took place once the facts had been found. Special verdicts enabled more facts to be put before the judges than were in the pleadings. The change was dependent on the ‘motions in banc’, particularly the motion in arrest of judgment, and later the motion for a new trial, which worked like a modern appeal save that they took place before judgment. The effect of dispensing with civil juries is considered, and the chapter ends with an account of procedural reforms.

Can animals sing? On birdsong, music and meaning

This article deals with conceptual questions regarding claims to the effect that humans and animals share artistic abilities such as the possession of music. Recent works focusing on animals, from such as Hollis Taylor and Dominique Lestel, are discussed. The attribution of artistic traits in human and animal contexts is examined by highlighting the importance of issues relating to categorization and evaluation in cross-species studies. An analogy between the denial of major attributes to animals and a form of racism is drawn in order to show how questions pertaining to meaning can impact on our understanding of animal abilities. One of the major theses presented is that the question of whether animals possess music cannot be answered by a methodology that is uninformed by the way concepts such as music or art function in the context of human life: the ascription of music to humans or non-humans is a value-laden act rather than a factual issue regarding how to represent an entity. In order to see how humans and animals share a life in common, it is necessary to come to the reflective realization that how human beings understand themselves can impact on their perception and experience of human and non-human animals.

Legal Update: New Guidelines for the Conduct of Care Proceedings

Re CB and JB (care proceedings: case conduct)[1998] 2 FCR 313 Family Division, Manchester. Wall J.Care proceedings were brought in respect of twins who were born in February 1996. It was alleged that one of them had been the victim of two shaking episodes, whilst in the care of their parents. In February 1998, a care order was made and the children were freed for adoption. The facts of the case were very simple, the only factual issue being which parent had inflicted the child's injuries. Care proceedings were commenced in November 1996 and the substantive hearing took place in February 1998; a large number of expert opinions had been sought; the legal advisers had not worked towards clarifying the issues. The judge, Mr Justice Wall, was highly critical of the conduct of the case and made a number of recommendations.

Conventional aspects of human action, its time, and its place

In the last few years a broad debate has taken place in books and journals about the time of action. Many different views have been propounded, and many an ingenious argument has been devised. I submit that those views are insightful but that the arguments have been misplaced. The views are at bottom compatible, for they differ in what they call ‘action’. I propose that our conception of action is so enveloped in conventions that there is no factual issue, per se, about the time and place of human action. There are actually several layers of conventionality involved in our timing and placing of actions. The crucial philosophical issues pertain to the clarification of those conventional layers. Among these issues are: (i) What are the conventions involved in timing and locating actions? (ii) What is the rationale for those conventions? (iii) Is that rationale sufficient to show the usefulness of those conventions? (iv) Can and should those conventions be improved upon?