The article discloses an interconnected set of strategic defects in the regulatory activities of the Bank of Russia in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, which predetermine the significant contribution of the neoliberal financial and credit policy pursued by them both to the development of an autonomous recession and the aggravation of the coronary crisis in our country. Based on a comparative analysis of the post-default and post-sanction devaluation of the ruble, a conclusion is made about the predominantly negative impact of the latter on the dynamics of Russian GDP and on inflationary processes in the country. The premature transition of the central bank to inflation targeting and, especially, to the free-floating ruble regime, the leading beneficiaries of which are disclosed commodity exporters, financial speculators and the Ministry of Finance, have been critically examined. The continued dominance of the foreign exchange channel in the Bank of Russia’s issuing activities over the credit channel and the inability of the financial authorities to cover the budget deficit through monetary financing are regarded as decisive factors preventing overcoming the coronavirus crisis on the way to a reasonable diversification of the domestic economy. The unjustified transition already in 2021 to a super-tight monetary and fiscal policy, which does not fit into the global practice of anti-crisis regulation, is seen as a kind of renaissance of the false monetarist approach in the activities of leading Russian regulators, their traditional reliance on the quantitative theory of money and the ensuing desire to overcome cost inflation using methods characteristic of combating demand inflation. As the end result of the noted manifestations of the fiasco of the Russian state in the money market, an extremely low coefficient of monetization of the domestic economy is considered, which prevents its breakthrough high-quality growth in the foreseeable future.