scholarly journals Debunking, supervenience, and Hume’s Principle

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (8) ◽  
pp. 1083-1103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Leng
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Realism ◽  
Mathematical Beliefs ◽  
Conceptual Truth ◽  
Hume’S Principle ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Facts

AbstractDebunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.

Morality and Mathematics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Clarke-Doane
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Mathematical Realism ◽  
Mathematical Beliefs ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Center Stage ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Moral Questions

This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified. It is also incorrect that reflection on the “genealogy” of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral anti-realist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical anti-realist too. And yet, the book argues that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together – and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense in which mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. It follows that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, are actually in tension. The author concludes that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, nature, and more are practical questions as well. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.

scholarly journals Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments

2020 ◽  
pp. 309-332
Author(s):  
Daniel Z. Korman ◽  
Dustin Locke
Keyword(s):  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Priority Thesis ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual connection to the moral facts (e.g. safety, sensitivity, reliability). The dominant, “minimalist” response to the arguments—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors” or “pre-established harmonies”—involves affirming that moral beliefs enjoy the relevant counterfactual connection while granting that these beliefs are not explained by the moral facts. The authors argue that the minimalist gambit rests on a controversial thesis about epistemic priority: that explanatory concessions derive their epistemic import from what they reveal about counterfactual connections. They then challenge this epistemic priority thesis, which undermines the minimalist response to debunking arguments (both in ethics and elsewhere).

scholarly journals Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations ◽  
Moral Facts

This chapter argues that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective. Such arguments rely on the premise that moral judgements can be given evolutionary explanations which do not invoke their truth. The challenge for the debunker is to bridge the gap between this premise and the conclusion that moral judgements are unjustified. After discussing older attempts to bridge this gap, this chapter focuses on Joyce’s recent attempt, which claims that ‘we do not have a believable account of how moral facts could explain the mechanisms…which give rise to moral judgements’. It argues that whether there is such an account depends on what it is permissible to assume about moral truth and that it is reasonable to make assumptions which allow for the possibility of at least partial moral epistemologies. The challenge for the debunker is to show that these assumptions are unreasonable in a way which does not render their debunking argument superfluous.

Nietzsche’s Anti-Realism about Value

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-48
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
Moral Facts

Nietzsche defends the metaphysical thesis that there are no objective (i.e. mind-independent) facts about values, including moral values. His primary arguments for his moral anti-realism are “best explanation” arguments: the best explanation of our moral judgments, indeed of the two-millennium long disagreements among moral philosophers, make no reference to objective moral facts. The details of an “inference to the best explanation” are laid out, and illustrated with Nietzsche’s own texts. Contemporary attempts to defend the explanatory role of moral facts are critiqued, and the radical implications of the argument from disagreement among philosophers considered and defended.

scholarly journals The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 744-767 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larisa Heiphetz ◽  
Nina Strohminger ◽  
Liane L. Young
Keyword(s):  
Moral Beliefs

scholarly journals Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-402
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Contemporary Perspective ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This précis is a brief summary of the book’s content.

Defending Moral Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Substantial Influence ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Main Basis

Wide-ranging debunking arguments aim to support moral skepticism based on empirical evidence (particularly of evolutionary pressures, framing effects, automatic emotional heuristics, and incidental emotions). But such arguments are subject to a debunker’s dilemma: they can identify an influence on moral belief that is either substantial or defective, but not both. When one identifies a genuinely defective influence on a large class of moral beliefs (e.g. framing effects), this influence is insubstantial, failing to render the beliefs unjustified. When one identifies a main basis for belief (e.g. automatic heuristics), the influence is not roundly defective. There is ultimately a trade-off for sweeping debunking arguments in ethics: identifying a substantial influence on moral belief implicates a process that is not genuinely defective. We thus lack empirical reason to believe that moral judgment is fundamentally flawed. Our dual process minds can yield justified moral beliefs despite automatically valuing more than an action’s consequences.

The Role of Moral Beliefs, Shame, and Guilt in Criminal Decision Making

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Svensson ◽  
Lieven J. R. Pauwels ◽  
Frank M. Weerman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Criminological Theory ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Early Experiences ◽  
Shame And Guilt ◽  
Rule Breaking

Morality, and particularly the capacity to experience shame and/or guilt, may be viewed as sediments of early experiences with the commitment of acts of crime and rule-breaking and the consequences of these acts. This chapter addresses the specific roles of moral beliefs and moral emotions such as shame and guilt and how they are related to criminal decisions. It presents an overview of relevant theoretical frameworks that explain why and how moral beliefs and moral emotions affect criminal decision making. The focus of this chapter is particularly on anticipations of shame and guilt, two powerful and painful emotions that humans naturally want to avoid. In addition, findings from empirical studies are reviewed, and implications for criminological theory and prevention are addressed.

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