scholarly journals Advocacy and Enactment: Exercitives and Acts of Arguing

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37
Author(s):  
Cristina Corredor

Goodwin and Innocenti (2016) have contended that giving reasons may be a form of enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view, the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should be analysed as a form of advocacy, and therefore as an exercitive speech act. In this paper I will suggest that acts of advocating, qua illocutions, institute a normative framework where the speaker’s obligation to justify cannot be redeemed by a mere “making reasons apparent”. In general, giving reasons is part of the procedure in virtue of which the advocate’s authority to exert influence is recognised by their addressees. This illocutionary effect should be distinguished from other perlocutionary consequences.

Hypatia ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 440-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kukla

AbstractI explore how gender can shape the pragmatics of speech. In some circumstances, when a woman deploys standard discursive conventions in order to produce a speech act with a specific performative force, her utterance can turn out, in virtue of its uptake, to have a quite different force—a less empowering force—than it would have if performed by a man. When members of a disadvantaged group face a systematic inability to produce a specific kind of speech act that they are entitled to perform—and in particular when their attempts result in their actually producing a different kind of speech act that further compromises their social position and agency—then they are victims of what I call discursive injustice. I examine three examples of discursive injustice. I contrast my account with Langton and Hornsby's account of illocutionary silencing. I argue that lack of complete control over the performative force of our speech acts is universal, and not a special marker of social disadvantage. However, women and other relatively disempowered speakers are sometimes subject to a distinctive distortion of the path from speaking to uptake, which undercuts their social agency in ways that track and enhance existing social disadvantages.


Author(s):  
Mona Simion ◽  
Christoph Kelp

Two important philosophical questions about assertion concern its nature and normativity. This article defends the optimism about the constitutive norm account of assertion and sets out a constitutivity thesis that is much more modest than that proposed by Timothy Williamson. It starts by looking at the extant objections to Williamson’s Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) and argues that they fail to hit their target in virtue of imposing implausible conditions on engaging in norm-constituted activities. Second, it makes a similar proposal and shows how it does better than the competition. It suggests that Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) is not constitutive of the speech act of assertion in the same way in which rules of games are constitutive, and thus KAA comes out as too strong. The final section embarks on a rescue mission on behalf of KAA; it puts forth a weaker, functionalist constitutivity thesis. On this view, KNA is etiologically constitutively associated with the speech act of assertion, in virtue of its function of generating knowledge in hearers.


2020 ◽  
pp. 89-101
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

This chapter offers a positive account of the speaker’s expectation of proper treatment (when she testifies that p). It does so in terms of the job that the speaker purports to be performing qua testifier, and the expectations she is entitled to have in virtue of the purport of that act. After noting that assertion is the speech act tailor made to enable a speaker to perform the type of job associated with acts of testifying, the chapter argues that it is the expectations one is entitled to have in making an assertion that generate the relevant conversational pressures. This makes clear how the pragmatic and interpersonal dimensions of this type of act interact with the epistemological dimension of testimonial transactions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 116-125
Author(s):  
Tom Dougherty

This chapter elaborates the Expression of Will View as a disjunctive view, in so far as it allows that there are two ways that someone can consent by expressing their will. First, they can deliberately perform a ‘directive’ speech act. Examples of these speech acts include requests, invitations, and orders. Second, someone can consent by expressing that they are giving another person permission. While it is possible to simultaneously give consent in both ways, there are some situations in which someone consents in only one of these two ways. Since the Expression of Will View allows that consent can be given in either of these two ways, it is a disjunctive view. Although a disjunctive view is less cohesive and simple, we need to endorse a disjunctive view to have an extensionally adequate account. But although the view is disjunctive, it has some unity in virtue of the fact that it has the Interpersonal Justification Argument as an underlying rationale.


Author(s):  
Sungmoon Kim

This chapter proposes a novel normative framework for criminal punishment, called the value theory of criminal punishment, as an alternative to desert-based retributivism. Contrary to retributivists who see criminal desert as pre-social and purely individualistic, the value theory understands it as embedded in communal values and social norms, and thus sees crime not in virtue of its pre-socially evaluated wrongness but in terms of a “normative blow” to the political community undergirded by such values and norms. In the Confucian society in particular, a normative blow to the community complexly implicates both the wrongdoer and the victim, as they are thought to exist not as independent rights-bearing individuals but as quasi-family members of the community. The chapter then singles out family crimes as the gravest moral violation in a Confucian society and justifies enhanced punishment for them from the perspective of the Confucian value theory.


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Wolf

The term “philosophy of language” is generally used more restrictively than newcomers to the discipline might expect. While philosophers of almost every stripe have something to say about language, people who speak of “philosophy of language” generally intend to restrict it to philosophers in the analytic tradition over the last one hundred years or so. This entry reflects that general convention. The entry also breaks the field down by major topic areas, with each later topic including at least one cornerstone work (usually more) and greater attention to recent papers of interest. The topics above (beyond the review of textbooks and supplements) may be thought of as falling into major groups based on a number of larger themes and questions in the field. After some historical review, we consider what our view on what languages must be: how do things become meaningful within a language and how do speakers adhere to the rules governing the language? We then look at how truth should be understood and, more narrowly, whether there are analytic truths (statements that are true in virtue of the meanings of their terms). Questions of how words themselves come to refer to or stand for parts of the world are then considered, both invariantly and in ways that are sensitive to context, including expressions of propositional attitudes. Two sections after that address more pragmatic matters in the philosophy of language: what is it to perform a speech act (and thus communicate with others) and what is it to use an expression metaphorically, deviating from accepted usage and yet being acknowledged by other speakers? We close with a review of an emerging debate between minimalists and contextualists over the degree to which the meanings of most of the language are fixed.


Disputatio ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (43) ◽  
pp. 253-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Martin

Abstract Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.


2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-122
Author(s):  
Cita Mustika Kusumah

This research aims to describe and give an overview of the use of sexual euphemism in pop and hip hop lyric songs to avoid taboo words which are usually unfreely to mention in public. The researcher uses qualitative method and descriptive method to analyze the data. The researcher uses forty songs consist of twenty pop songs and twenty hip hop songs to be analysed. From forty songs, the researcher finds ninety seven data. Researcher believes the data are found to contain sexual euphemism in the utterance that included in pragmatic study.Researcher describes and analyzes every single of data that are included the theory of Allan and Buridge (1991). From the research data, the researcher found that there is a differential usage of sexual euphemism in pop and hip hop which is sexual euphemism in sexual activity appears more frequently in pop songs and sexual euphemism in sexual body parts appears more frequently in hip hop songs. Both pop and hip hop songs use representative speech act more frequently than directive speech act. Euphemism was used in the lyrics to avoid words that are considered taboo in some communities.Keywords: speech act, sexual euphemismINTRODUCTIONIn


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document