How to Treat a Testifier

2020 ◽  
pp. 89-101
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

This chapter offers a positive account of the speaker’s expectation of proper treatment (when she testifies that p). It does so in terms of the job that the speaker purports to be performing qua testifier, and the expectations she is entitled to have in virtue of the purport of that act. After noting that assertion is the speech act tailor made to enable a speaker to perform the type of job associated with acts of testifying, the chapter argues that it is the expectations one is entitled to have in making an assertion that generate the relevant conversational pressures. This makes clear how the pragmatic and interpersonal dimensions of this type of act interact with the epistemological dimension of testimonial transactions.

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kees Hengeveld

I have argued elsewhere (Hengeveld, 1987b) that for a proper treatment of modality the clause model used in Functional Grammar (Dik, 1978, 1980) should be adapted in such a way that a number of different layers can be distinguished. My main argument there was that predications, used in Functional Grammar to represent linguistic expressions, have two different functions: a DESCRIPTIVE function and a CONTENT function. A predication not only gives a description of the external situation the speaker refers to within his speech act, it also represents the prepositional content or message unit processed within that speech act. Subjective and evidential modalities, which express a propositional attitude, should take a predication in its contentrepresenting function in their scope, whereas objective modalities, i.e. those modalities that are concerned with the actuality status of a State of Affairs (SoA), should take a predication in its SoA-designating function in their scope. A clause model should therefore be able to distinguish between these two functions of predications.


Hypatia ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 440-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kukla

AbstractI explore how gender can shape the pragmatics of speech. In some circumstances, when a woman deploys standard discursive conventions in order to produce a speech act with a specific performative force, her utterance can turn out, in virtue of its uptake, to have a quite different force—a less empowering force—than it would have if performed by a man. When members of a disadvantaged group face a systematic inability to produce a specific kind of speech act that they are entitled to perform—and in particular when their attempts result in their actually producing a different kind of speech act that further compromises their social position and agency—then they are victims of what I call discursive injustice. I examine three examples of discursive injustice. I contrast my account with Langton and Hornsby's account of illocutionary silencing. I argue that lack of complete control over the performative force of our speech acts is universal, and not a special marker of social disadvantage. However, women and other relatively disempowered speakers are sometimes subject to a distinctive distortion of the path from speaking to uptake, which undercuts their social agency in ways that track and enhance existing social disadvantages.


Author(s):  
Mona Simion ◽  
Christoph Kelp

Two important philosophical questions about assertion concern its nature and normativity. This article defends the optimism about the constitutive norm account of assertion and sets out a constitutivity thesis that is much more modest than that proposed by Timothy Williamson. It starts by looking at the extant objections to Williamson’s Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) and argues that they fail to hit their target in virtue of imposing implausible conditions on engaging in norm-constituted activities. Second, it makes a similar proposal and shows how it does better than the competition. It suggests that Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) is not constitutive of the speech act of assertion in the same way in which rules of games are constitutive, and thus KAA comes out as too strong. The final section embarks on a rescue mission on behalf of KAA; it puts forth a weaker, functionalist constitutivity thesis. On this view, KNA is etiologically constitutively associated with the speech act of assertion, in virtue of its function of generating knowledge in hearers.


Kant Yearbook ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin R. Busch

AbstractWhile Kant does not address the problem of induction often attributed to Hume, he does, by way of a transcendental deduction of an a priori principle of reflecting empirical judgment, address a distinct problem Hume raises indirectly. This problem is that induction cannot be justified so long as it presupposes some empirical concept applying to or some empirical principle true of more than one object in nature, a presupposition neither determined by nor founded on reason. I draw on Hume’s positive account of induction to motivate the following objection to Kant: in so far as induction can be justified, there is reason to doubt that it would be so in virtue of any a priori feature


2021 ◽  
pp. 116-125
Author(s):  
Tom Dougherty

This chapter elaborates the Expression of Will View as a disjunctive view, in so far as it allows that there are two ways that someone can consent by expressing their will. First, they can deliberately perform a ‘directive’ speech act. Examples of these speech acts include requests, invitations, and orders. Second, someone can consent by expressing that they are giving another person permission. While it is possible to simultaneously give consent in both ways, there are some situations in which someone consents in only one of these two ways. Since the Expression of Will View allows that consent can be given in either of these two ways, it is a disjunctive view. Although a disjunctive view is less cohesive and simple, we need to endorse a disjunctive view to have an extensionally adequate account. But although the view is disjunctive, it has some unity in virtue of the fact that it has the Interpersonal Justification Argument as an underlying rationale.


TOTOBUANG ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-114
Author(s):  
Pipiet Palestin Amurwani

Guidance and counseling teachers or commonly called BK teachers have a very important role in schools. Students who have behavioral problems must get proper treatment so they can change for the better. Therefore, a BK teacher should have a good skill in language beside the counseling competence he/she has. The purpose of this study is  describing the speech acts carried out by BK teachers in SMK 7 Jember in guiding problematic students. The data was successfully collected through the record and note technique is in the form of BK teacher's speech when conducting guidance which is a speech act. The data source comes from a BK teacher at the 7th Jember Vocational School who conducts guidance for students who play truant, drink alcohol outside the school, and smoke in the school environment. The data was analyzed using the pragmatic theory of speech acts of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), and combined with theories of counseling techniques. The results showed that there were 12 speech acts used by BK teachers in the process of guiding three students' problems and illocutionary speech acts tended to be used in the guidance process.Guru bimbingan dan konseling atau yang biasa disebut guru BK memiliki peran yang sangat penting di sekolah . Peserta didik yang bermasalah dalam perilaku harus mendapat penanganan yang tepat supaya dapat berubah ke arah yang lebih baik. Oleh karena itu, guru BK harus memiliki keterampilan berbahasa yang baik di samping kompetensi konseling yang dimiliki. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mendeskripsikan tindak tutur yang dilakukan oleh guru BK di SMKN 7 Jember dalam melakukan bimbingan bagi peserta didik yang bermasalah. Data yang berhasil dikumpulkan melalui teknik rekam dan catat adalah berupa tuturan guru BK ketika melakukan bimbingan yang merupakan tindak tutur. Sumber data berasal dari seorang guru BK di SMKN 7 Jember yang melakukan bimbingan terhadap peserta didik yang melakukan tindakan membolos, meminum minuman keras di luar sekolah, dan merokok di lingkungan sekolah. Data tersebut dianalisis menggunakan teori pragmatik tindak tutur Austin (1962) dan Searle (1969) serta dipadukan dengan teori mengenai teknik-teknik konseling. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa terdapat 12 tindak tutur yang digunakan guru BK pada proses bimbingan tiga masalah peserta didik dan  tindak tutur ilokusi cenderung digunakan dalam proses bimbingan tersebut. 


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Wolf

The term “philosophy of language” is generally used more restrictively than newcomers to the discipline might expect. While philosophers of almost every stripe have something to say about language, people who speak of “philosophy of language” generally intend to restrict it to philosophers in the analytic tradition over the last one hundred years or so. This entry reflects that general convention. The entry also breaks the field down by major topic areas, with each later topic including at least one cornerstone work (usually more) and greater attention to recent papers of interest. The topics above (beyond the review of textbooks and supplements) may be thought of as falling into major groups based on a number of larger themes and questions in the field. After some historical review, we consider what our view on what languages must be: how do things become meaningful within a language and how do speakers adhere to the rules governing the language? We then look at how truth should be understood and, more narrowly, whether there are analytic truths (statements that are true in virtue of the meanings of their terms). Questions of how words themselves come to refer to or stand for parts of the world are then considered, both invariantly and in ways that are sensitive to context, including expressions of propositional attitudes. Two sections after that address more pragmatic matters in the philosophy of language: what is it to perform a speech act (and thus communicate with others) and what is it to use an expression metaphorically, deviating from accepted usage and yet being acknowledged by other speakers? We close with a review of an emerging debate between minimalists and contextualists over the degree to which the meanings of most of the language are fixed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37
Author(s):  
Cristina Corredor

Goodwin and Innocenti (2016) have contended that giving reasons may be a form of enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view, the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should be analysed as a form of advocacy, and therefore as an exercitive speech act. In this paper I will suggest that acts of advocating, qua illocutions, institute a normative framework where the speaker’s obligation to justify cannot be redeemed by a mere “making reasons apparent”. In general, giving reasons is part of the procedure in virtue of which the advocate’s authority to exert influence is recognised by their addressees. This illocutionary effect should be distinguished from other perlocutionary consequences.


Disputatio ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (43) ◽  
pp. 253-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Martin

Abstract Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.


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