A study of the functions of political appointees from a comparative perspective

In this article, the functions of political appointees have been classified by an index on the relation between politics and bureaucracy. Based on that classification, the real states of four democracies, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Japan, have been examined. From this study, the causation consisting of the politico-administrative relation (concretely, the insider-outsider factor and the line-staff factor), the independent value, and the political appointees' functions (advice, decision-making and interface between politicians and civil servants), the dependent value, has been confirmed. Through this examination from a comparative perspective, a proposal of generalization about the political appointees' functions has been presented.

Political appointees vs. elected officials: Examining how the selection mechanism for state governing agency board members influences responsiveness to stakeholders in higher education policy-making

Through an exploratory comparative case study of two U.S. states (Georgia and Nevada), this study investigates how the selection mechanism to state higher education governing agency boards influences the responsiveness of board members to stakeholders and their role in the policy-making process. Framed around the recent national policy agenda to improve postsecondary degree attainment and college completion, findings suggest that state agency board members in both states prioritized the opinions, insights, and goals of the state governor and governing agency staff, regardless of selection mechanism. However, for more localized issues and on-the-ground decision-making, stakeholders formally involved in the day-to-day operation of higher education, such as administrators, faculty, and students, serve a larger role, though this influence can be mediated by the selection mechanism of board members.

Expertise Unheeded

In responding to pandemics, members from the middle levels of the US government have tried, usually futilely, to get the political appointees above them to do the right thing, or merely to pay attention. In The Premonition: A Pandemic Story, Michael Lewis describes official responses to pandemic crises in the US from 1918 to the present, focusing on reactions within the Trump administration.

Are You Experienced? US Ambassadors and International Crises, 1946–2014

How important are ambassadors in international politics? While a growing body of research stresses the importance of diplomacy in international politics, it remains unclear if individual ambassadors make a significant difference or what attributes make for an effective ambassador. This paper explores these questions through a systematic analysis of 2,730 US ambassadors between 1946 and 2014. The United States is distinctive in that it sends a sizable number of noncareer political appointees to serve as ambassadors. This provides a unique opportunity to examine how an ambassador's experience shapes where they are placed and how they perform. Using various techniques to address selection effects, including matching, I find that the United States is less likely to experience a militarized dispute with a host nation when it is represented by a political ambassador. Moreover, political ambassadors with professional experience in politics or the military, those who are close to the president, and those who are appointed in permissive congressional environments are less likely to experience militarized disputes during their tenure. Individual ambassadors matter, but diplomatic experience alone is not the only attribute that makes for an effective ambassador.

Indirect accountability of political appointees

This paper explores the indirect accountability of political appointees. The appointee’s quality is uncertain, and voters hold the politician accountable for the appointee’s performance. The politician has better information about the appointee than voters do, but electoral concerns induce the politician to make inefficient retention decisions. Specifically, there is over-retention of appointees relative to the social optimum. If the quality of candidates for appointment is low, then improving the pool of candidates can help reduce distortions and, in fact, it is in the interest of the politician to do so. I also show that more public information about the appointee reduces over-retention.

Debasement of Merit: The Method and Experience of Political Discrimination by Public Employees in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

While most democratic governments include some political appointees at the top of agencies for the sake of bureaucratic accountability, too much patronage decreases government performance. Puerto Rico has all of the components for a robust merit system on paper, but it is consistently undermined, with significant negative consequences for public employees. Based on an inductive analysis of 29 in-depth interviews with public employees and 50 political discrimination court cases, this article shows how an informal patronage system is implemented by incorporating political information into personnel decisions. The pervasiveness of this system results in employees being categorized as either insiders or outsiders, where outsider status is accompanied by harassment, ostracizing, and other negative changes in working conditions. These shifts in status sustain patronage practices by crystalizing political identity, which increases partisan polarization, and provides a rationale and justification for future politically discriminatory actions.

Assessment of Young People’s Motivation for Pursuit of Higher Degree in the Field of Education: Implications for Educational Philosophy and Teacher Policy in Nigeria

This study assesses students’ motivation for the pursuit of higher degree in the field of Education. Due to their current low-income status (mean value of less than $2 day) and their desired income (mean value of $500 per day) 10 years after acquiring the degree, it is instructive and tractable to examine the income effect of their motivation. Their current low-income status suggests that they are on the average, meeting basic needs such as food and clothing. In addition, their desired income suggests that they desire to possibly move up the zenith of the hierarchies of need. Thus, current income, desired income, choice to work in the educational sector, intended career destination, and (revealed) altruistic motive for teaching in primary and secondary schools after moving up in the ladder of needs were measures of motivation and dependent variables. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and discrete choice models were estimated to identify the determinants of these measures. Results show that very few students had wanted to study Education at undergraduate level. Motivation for their enrolment in postgraduate education, however, is apparently pecuniary and essentially market driven. Most of the students preferred high-paying professions within the education sector—lectureship positions in the tertiary institutions, influencing policies as politicians and political appointees, and running educational businesses. Although, a few students intended to teach in future at the basic level, primary and secondary levels, most of them possess altruistic motives to teach, that is, to mentor students.

Patronage and Public Administration

The concept of patronage refers to the power of political actors to appoint trusted individuals by discretion to nonelective positions in the public sector. This proposed new definition avoids an exclusive association with less developed countries and recognizes the presence of patronage in modern democracies, drawing a distinction with broader terms such as clientelism and politicization. Patronage differs from clientelism because the reasons for providing patronage include a list of other motives beyond the classic particularistic allocation of public resources. At the same time, patronage is not strictly equal to politicization, as this definition reduces the influence that politicians exert on the administrative machinery to a distribution of posts. In specifying what patronage is in narrower terms, this definition merges two different literatures, one associated with institutions and political parties, and another with bureaucracies, public policy, and governance issues. Even though the meritocratic civil service is a hallmark of modern democracies, the presence of political appointees in these societies is universal. Patronage provides some benefits for governance, and any normative assessment of this type of appointment should consider the costs and benefits of this practice within each particular political and cultural context.