Implication, Equivalence, and Negation

A system $HCL_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ in the language of {$ \neg, \leftrightarrow $} is obtained by adding a single negation-less axiom schema to $HLL_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ (the standard Hilbert-type system for multiplicative linear logic without propositional constants), and changing $ \rightarrow $ to $\leftrightarrow$. $HCL_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ is weakly, but not strongly, sound and complete for ${\bf CL}_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ (the {$ \neg,\leftrightarrow$} – fragment of classical logic). By adding the Ex Falso rule to $HCL_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ we get a system with is strongly sound and complete for ${\bf CL}_ {\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ . It is shown that the use of a new rule cannot be replaced by the addition of axiom schemas. A simple semantics for which $HCL_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ itself is strongly sound and complete is given. It is also shown that $L_{HCL}$$_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ , the logic induced by $HCL_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ , has a single non-trivial proper axiomatic extension, that this extension and ${\bf CL}_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ are the only proper extensions in the language of { $\neg$, $\leftrightarrow$ } of $ {\bf L}_{HCL}$$_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ , and that $ {\bf L}_{HCL}$$_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ and its single axiomatic extension are the only logics in {$ \neg, \leftrightarrow$ } which have a connective with the relevant deduction property, but are not equivalent $\neg$ to an axiomatic extension of ${\bf R}_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ (the intensional fragment of the relevant logic ${\bf R}$). Finally, we discuss the question whether $ {\bf L}_{HCL}$$_{\overset{\neg}{\leftrightarrow}}$ can be taken as a paraconsistent logic.

Das mehrsortige axiomatische System MS

SummaryIn this article we define in an exact and clear way a many-sorted axiomatical first-order system with identity and we prove its weak consistency and weak completeness. In e.g. Wang (1952) and Oberschelp (1962), the necessary definitions and proofs are often only sketched. In this article we intend to present a complete demonstration of each result. Thus we will set out each proof in a systematic way, stating all necessary definitions and lemmata. The base of our system is the axiomatical system in Mates (1972), pp. 215ff, but we do without propositional constants and propositional variables.

Subnets of proof-nets in multiplicative linear logic with MIX

This paper studies the properties of the subnets of a proof-net for first-order Multiplicative Linear Logic without propositional constants (MLL−), extended with the rule of Mix: from [vdash ]Γ and [vdash ]Δ infer [vdash ]Γ, Δ. Asperti's correctness criterion and its interpretation in terms of concurrent processes are extended to the first-order case. The notions of kingdom and empire of a formula are extended from MLL− to MLL−+MIX. A new proof of the sequentialization theorem is given. As a corollary, a system of proof-nets is given for De Paiva and Hyland's Full Intuitionistic Linear Logic with Mix; this result gives a general method for translating Abramsky-style term assignments into proof-nets, and vice versa.

Bimodal logics for extensions of arithmetical theories

We characterize the bimodal provability logics for certain natural (classes of) pairs of recursively enumerable theories, mostly related to fragments of arithmetic. For example, we shall give axiomatizations, decision procedures, and introduce natural Kripke semantics for the provability logics of (IΔ0 + EXP, PRA); (PRA, IΣn); (IΣm, IΣn) for 1 ≤ m < n; (PA, ACA0); (ZFC, ZFC + CH); (ZFC, ZFC + ¬CH) etc. For the case of finitely axiomatized extensions of theories these results are extended to modal logics with propositional constants.

Implicational complexity in intuitionistic arithmetic

In classical arithmetic a natural measure for the complexity of relations is provided by the number of quantifier alternations in an equivalent prenex normal form. However, the proof of the Prenex Normal Form Theorem uses the following intuitionistically invalid rules for permuting quantifiers with propositional constants.Each one of these schemas, when added to Intuitionistic (Heyting's) Arithmetic IA, generates full Classical (Peano's) Arithmetic. Schema (3) is of little interest here, since one can obtain a formula intuitionistically equivalent to A ∨ ∀xBx, which is prenex if A and B are:For the two conjuncts on the r.h.s. (1) may be successively applied, since y = 0 is decidable.We shall readily verify that there is no way of similarly going around (1) or (2). This fact calls for counting implication (though not conjunction or disjunction) in measuring in IA the complexity of arithmetic relations. The natural implicational measure for our purpose is the depth of negative nestings of implication, defined as follows. I(F): = 0 if F is atomic; I(F ∧ G) = I(F ∨ G): = max[I(F), I(G)]; I(∀xF) = I(∃xF): = I(F); I(F → G):= max[I(F) + 1, I(G)].

The inadequacy of the neighbourhood semantics for modal logic

We present two finitely axiomatized modal propositional logics, one between T and S4 and the other an extension of S4, which are incomplete with respect to the neighbourhood or Scott-Montague semantics.Throughout this paper we are referring to logics which contain all the classical connectives and only one modal connective □ (unary), no propositional constants, all classical tautologies, and which are closed under the rules of modus ponens (MP), substitution, and the rule RE (from A ↔ B infer αA ↔ □B). Such logics are called classical by Segerberg [6]. Classical logics which contain the formula □p ∧ □q → □(p ∧ q) (denoted by K) and its “converse,” □{p ∧ q)→ □p ∧ □q (denoted by R) are called regular; regular logics which are closed under the rule of necessitation, RN (from A infer □A), are called normal. The logics that we are particularly concerned with are all normal, although some of our results will be true for all regular or all classical logics. It is well known that K and R and closure under RN imply closure under RE and also that normal logics are also those logics closed under RN and containing □{p → q) → {□p → □q).