Why metaphysics matters for the science-theology debate – an incarnational case study

This article examines the relationship between science and theology within a critical realist framework. Focusing on the role of metaphysics as a unifying starting point, especially in consideration of theological issues that are concerned with corporeality and temporality (such as in the incarnation). Some metaphysical challenges that lead to the appearance of “paradox” in the incarnation are highlighted, and the implications of two forms of holistic scientific ontology on the appearance of a paradox in the incarnation are explored. It is concluded that ultimately both science and theology are concerned with the nature of reality, and the search for coherent models that can describe the unseen. Whilst one should maintain a criticality to any realist conception of theological and scientific theories, a shared metaphysics ensures theological doctrine can continue to be interpreted with relevance in a world in which scientific thought is increasingly stretching into the meta-scientific.

Strong and Weak Disjunctivism: A Short Comparative Essay

The brief essay is devoted to the articulation of the main claims of strong disjunctivism in its comparison with weak disjunctivism. They are examined in the main part of the essay as constituting the only possible way to defend a realist conception of truth that combines internalism with the thesis of the independence of truth from introspective justification. It is concluded that weak disjunctivism, even though it compares favorably with its opponents in this respect, cannot claim to defend a realist conception of truth.

Burning the straw man: What exactly is psychological science?

Problemification: Efendic and Van Zyl (2019) argue for following open access-based principles in IO psychology following the recent crises in psychological research. Among others, these refer to the failure to replicate empirical studies which cast doubt on the trustworthiness of what we believe to be psychological knowledge. However, saving knowledge is not the issue at stake: focusing on transparency and compliance to standards might solve some problems but not all.Implications: The crisis focuses our attention on what science is and particularly science in psychology and its related disciplines. Both the scientist–practitioner model of training psychologists and the quantitative–qualitative methods polarity reveal the influence of the received or positivistic view of science as characterised by quantification and measurement. Postmodern resistance to positivism feeds these polarities and conceals the true nature of psychological science.Purpose: This article argues for a realist conception of science that sustains a variety of methods, from interpretative and constructionist approaches to measurement. However, in this view, measurement is not a defining characteristic of science, but a way to find things out and the latter supports a critical process.Recommendations: Revising our understanding of science, thus moving beyond the received view to a realist one, is crucial to manage misconceptions about what counts as knowledge and as appropriate measures when our discipline is in the crossfire. Thus, Efendic and Van Zyl’s (2019) proposals make sense and can be taken on board where measurement as one of the ways to find things out is appropriate. However, realism supports a broader enterprise that can be called scientific because it involves a critical movement of claim and counter-claim while executing its taxonomical and explanatory tasks. Thus, the psychosocial researcher, when analysing discourse, for example, can also be regarded as a scientist.

The Philosophy of Management Ideas

The philosophies that underpin studies of management ideas are rarely interrogated, which, it is argued here, leads to several difficulties for research in this field. This chapter makes explicit four philosophies which commonly underpin work in this area and argues that, among other limitations, their ontological strictures make interdisciplinary communication difficult. The chapter introduces critical realism, arguing that its stratified, emergent, and realist ontology can (partially) integrate the strengths from these different philosophies, whilst ameliorating their respective weaknesses. Finally, the chapter sketches out a critical realist conception of management ideas.

Music, the Realist Conception of Art and the Materialist Conception of History

Our fraught political moment is a propitious one for renewing the Marxist approach to music. Because that approach has consistently been folded into a more general Marxist discourse on art and aesthetics, any attempt must begin by revisiting what is essential to that discourse. I take its keystone to be the realist conception of art. This conception holds that artworks are a means by which at least some of their appreciators come to know truths about the world outside consciousness. Insofar as they are representational, painting, fiction, music, and drama potentially constitute vehicles for coming to understand the real world. Artistic representation on this view is understood to be analogous to mental representation.Previous studies of Marxist aesthetics have followed Maurice Merleau-Ponty in making a sharp distinction between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ branches of the tradition. The Eastern, beleaguered by the exigencies of Communist Party rule is often presented as the corrupt twin of the Western. The latter, developed in relative freedom and informed by a Hegelian legacy suppressed by Stalinism, alone commands theoretical, rather than merely historical, interest. This article departs from this Cold War framework in arguing that the Hegelian strand in Marxist aesthetics grows out of its Bolshevik predecessor and, crucially, shares with it a realist conception of art. After reconstructing the emergence and development of this conception (paying special attention to how music is directly addressed in the literature), I evaluate the compatibility of the realist conception of art with the materialist conception of history as it is found in Marx and Engels. I ultimately argue that moving past the realist conception of art is key to renewing the Marxist approach to music for our time.

Scientific realism and social science

A central issue in the philosophy of the social sciences is the possibility of naturalism: whether disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, economics and psychology can be ‘scientific’ in broadly the same sense in which this term is applied to physics, chemistry, biology and so on. In the long history of debates about this issue, both naturalists and anti-naturalists have tended to accept a particular view of the natural sciences – the ‘positivist’ conception of science. But the challenges to this previously dominant position in the philosophy of science from around the 1960s made this shared assumption increasingly problematic. It was no longer clear what would be implied by the naturalist requirement that the social sciences should be modelled on the natural sciences. It also became necessary to reconsider the arguments previously employed by anti-naturalists, to see whether these held only on the assumption of a positivist conception of science. If so, a non-positivist naturalism might be defended: a methodological unity of the social and natural sciences based on some alternative to positivism. That this is possible has been argued by scientific realists in the social sciences, drawing on a particular alternative to positivism: the realist conception of science developed in the 1970s by Harré and others.

Planck, Max Karl Ernst Ludwig (1858–1947)

Planck was a German theoretical physicist and leader of the German physics community in the first half of the twentieth century. Famous for his introduction of the quantum hypothesis in physics, Planck was also a prolific writer on popular-scientific and philosophical topics. Even more so than his younger contemporary Albert Einstein, Planck was well-known in his day for his defence of a realist conception of science and his explicit criticism of the positivism of Ernst Mach and the Vienna Circle.

Aesthetic Reasons

Aesthetic reasons are reasons to do and think various things. For example, it makes sense to wonder if a tree stump on the lawn was left there for environmental rather than aesthetic reasons, or for no reason at all. Aesthetic considerations of this kind are often contrasted with non-aesthetic reasons—such as moral or epistemic reasons. For example, they seem connected to pleasure-in-experience in a distinctive way that differs from paradigmatic moral reasons. Relatedly, the authority of aesthetic reasons has often been thought to involve less of an “external demand” upon us than in the other cases. In this chapter, I suggest that such distinctiveness and modesty coheres well with an anti-realist treatment that views them as non-objective in nature. I then go on to consider an alternative, more robustly realist conception of aesthetic reasons.