PREDATORY PRICING: SINGLE- FIRM DOMINANCE, EXCLUSIONARY ABUSE AND PREDATORY PRICES (PART 3)

Important pronouncements of legal principle were recently made by the Competition Appeal Court and Constitutional Court on the determination of predatory pricing under section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. These pronouncements must now be seen in the context of the subsequent commencement of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018. In light of these developments, this three-part series of articles evaluate the law relating to the economic concept of predatory pricing under the Competition Act. In this context, the crucial elements of dominance and abuse are also discussed. The first in this series of three articles critically evaluated the law on the determination of single-firm dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act. The second article discussed the basic forms of abuse, the meaning of abuse, tests that have been developed to identify exclusionary conduct, the criticism of the traditional theory of predatory pricing, the main strategic economic theories of predatory pricing and non-pricing theories of predation. This article focuses on the law of predatory prices under section 8(1)(c) and 8(1)(d)(iv) of the Competition Act. Pursuant to section 1(3) of the Competition Act, when interpreting or applying the Competition Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered. This is complementary to section 1(2)(a), which directs that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and which gives effect to the purposes set out in section 2. In light hereof and where appropriate, the South African position is mainly compared with the position in the European Union and the United States.

Predatory Pricing Under the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 2019 of Nigeria: An Unfinished Business

Predatory pricing is one of the market practices that are prohibited in competition law. It occurs when a dominant firm sells its product at an unreasonably low price in order to eliminate competitors from the market. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2019 of Nigeria prohibits this practice. This article, therefore, examines predatory pricing under the Act. It argues that the prescription of the cost-based principles of marginal and average cost as sole determinants of predatory pricing under the Act would not provide the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) and courts with the appropriate legal standard in determining predatory pricing. It suggests that the provision of the law should be reformed to include the principle of recoupment as a legal standard for imposing liability for the practice against defaulting firms. This will assist the FCCPC and courts to distinguish pro-competitive predatory pricing from anticompetitive predatory pricing.

Pemberian Voucher Promo oleh Gojek Ditinjau dari Hukum Persaingan Usaha

Undang-Undang No 5 tahun 1999 tentang Persaingan Usaha mengatur bahwa pelaku usaha dilarang untuk melakukan kegiatan usaha dengan strategi pemasaran jual rugi (Predatory Pricing) untuk memikat konsumen dan melindungi posisinya. Saat ini, banyak sekali pelaku usaha terutama mereka yang berkecimpung di bisnis online yang melakukan pemberian potongan harga besar-besaran sebagai sarana untuk menarik minat konsumen, salah satu pelaku usaha yang menggunakan strategi tersebut adalah Gojek. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah pemberian potongan harga yang dilakukan oleh Gojek merupakan praktik jual rugi (predatory pricing) dan bagaimana akibat hukum yang harus ditanggung oleh pelaku usaha apabila terbukti melakukan jual rugi. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode penelitian normatif. Teknik pengumpulan data dalam penelitian ini dilakukan dengan studi pustaka dan metode pendekatan yang digunakan adalah pendekatan undang-undang (statue approach). Data yang diperoleh kemudian dianalisis dengan cara kualitatif dengan metode deskriptif. Hasil yang diperoleh menunjukkan bahwa pemberian potongan harga yang dilakukan oleh Gojek tidak bisa dikatakan jual rugi (predatory pricing) dikarenakan tidak memenuhi syarat seperti yang dijelaskan dalam Pasal 20 Undang-Undang No 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Persaingan Usaha dan Anti Monopoli. Implikasi yang akan diperoleh pelaku usaha apabila terbukti melakukan jual rugi (predatory pricing) akan dikenai sanksi sebagaimana yang diatur dalam Undang-Undang No 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Pesaingan Usaha dan Anti Monopoli.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

PREDATORY PRICING: SINGLE- FIRM DOMINANCE, EXCLUSIONARY ABUSE AND PREDATORY PRICES (PART 2)

Important pronouncements of legal principle were recently made by the Competition Appeal Court and Constitutional Court on the determination of predatory pricing under section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. These pronouncements must now be seen in the context of the subsequent commencement of certain provisions of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018, which affect predatory pricing cases under section 8 of the Act. In light of these developments, the main aim of this series of three articles is to evaluate the law relating to the economic concept of predatory pricing under the Competition Act. In this context, the main constituent elements of a predatory pricing case – namely dominance, identifying an exclusionary abuse, and predatory prices – are discussed in three parts. Part 1 has critically evaluated the law on the determination of single-firm dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act. Part 2 starts to focus on the abuse analysis and discusses the basic forms of abuse, the meaning of abuse, tests that have been developed to identify exclusionary abuse, the criticism of the traditional theory of predatory pricing, the main strategic economic theories of predatory pricing and non-pricing theories of predation. Part 3 then specifically deals with the law of predatory prices under section 8(c) and (d)(iv) of the Competition Act. Pursuant to section 1(3) of the Competition Act, when interpreting or applying the Competition Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered. This is complementary to section 1(2)(a), which directs that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and gives effect to the purposes set out in section 2. In light hereof, where appropriate, the South African position is mainly compared with the position in the European Union and the United States.

9. Monopolies and the abuse of market power

‘Monopolies and the abuse of market power’ studies monopolies and the abuse of market power. The first step in applying competition law to misuse of market power is the identification of such power. How powerful should you be to be deemed to have market power that could trigger antitrust intervention? Many jurisdictions will use the benchmark of ‘dominant position’, some will use ‘monopoly power’ or ‘monopolization’, while others may focus on the presence of ‘superior bargaining position’. There is a difference in approach between the US and EU competition laws which can be seen through several categories of abuse and monopolization, including predatory pricing, excessive pricing, and refusal to supply or license.

Predatory Pricing: Single-Firm Dominance Exclusionary Abuse and Predatory Prices (Part 1)

Important pronouncements of legal principle were recently made by the Competition Appeal Court and Constitutional Court on the determination of predatory pricing under section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. These pronouncements must now be seen in the context of the subsequent commencement of certain provisions of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018, which affect predatory pricing cases under section 8 of the Act. In light of these developments, the main aim of this series of three articles is to evaluate the law relating to the economic concept of predatory pricing under the Competition Act. In this context, the main constituent elements of a predatory pricing case – namely, dominance, identifying an exclusionary abuse and predatory prices – are discussed in three parts. Part One critically evaluates the law on the determination of single-firm dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act. Part Two starts to focus on abuse analysis and discusses the basic forms of abuse, the meaning of abuse, tests that have been developed to identify exclusionary abuse, criticism of the traditional theory of predatory pricing, the main strategic economic theories of predatory pricing and non-pricing theories of predation. Part Three then specifically deals with the law of predatory prices under section 8(c) and 8(d)(iv) of the Competition Act. Pursuant to section 1(3) of the Competition Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered when interpreting or applying the Competition Act. This is complementary to section 1(2)(a), which directs that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 2. In light hereof, where appropriate, the South African position is compared, mainly with the position in the European Union and the United States.

Pengaturan Predatory Pricing Transportasi Online Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha

Dalam dunia usaha, persaingan yang terjadi di antara para pelaku usaha sudah biasa terjadi. Pelaku usaha yang melakukan persaingan usaha dengan sehat akan mendatangkan dampak yang positif terhadap jalannya persaingan antara pelaku usaha lainnya. Namun, pada kenyataannya ada juga pelaku usaha yang melakukan persaingan usaha dengan cara yang tidak sehat yang akan berdampak buruk bagi keseimbangan dalam persaingan usaha. Permasalahan dari penelitian ini adalah: 1) Bagaimanakah pengaturan predatory pricing dalam persaingan usaha di Indonesia dan 2) Bagaimanakah relevansi promosi sebagai sarana pemasaran transportasi online terhadap pengaturan hukum predatory pricing. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode penelitian hukum normatif sehingga pendekatan masalah yang digunakan yaitu pendekatan perundang-undangan, konseptual, dan kasus serta menggunakan bahan hukum primer dan sekunder. Sehingga teknik pengumpulan bahan hukum yang digunakan yaitu teknik dokumentasi dengan mengolah dan menganalisis bahan-bahan hukum yang telah terkumpul dengan mempergunakan argumentasi hukum. Adapun hasil dari penelitian ini adalah pengaturan mengenai larangan melakukan praktik predatory pricing terdapat pada Pasal 20 Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Larangan Praktik Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat dan relevansi promosi sebagai sarana pemasaran transportasi online terhadap pengaturan hukum predatory pricing dalam Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1999 tidak diatur mengenai promosi berlebihan dengan harga yang sangat rendah sehingga dapat menimbulkan unsur praktik predatory pricing.

Indikasi Predatory Pricing Yang Dilakukan Ovo Dengan Cara Burning Money

Predatory pricing adalah praktek menjual rugi sebagai strategi penetapan harga dimana harga yang ditetapkan atas suatu produk atau layanan sangat rendah dari harga pasaran industri dengan tujuan untuk mencari konsumen baru serta menciptakan hambatan bagi pesaing usaha lain yang akan masuk sehingga bisa menyingkirkan pesaing usaha yang lain dan bisa menguasai pasar. Tindakan ini sering disebut upaya illegal dalam menguasai pasar karena menghilangkan persaingan sehat sehingga pasar lebih rentan menjadi monopoli. Konsep keuangan startup sendiri memang akrab dengan konsep bakar uang atau burning money/cash burn dimana kondisi ini terjadi jika pengeluaran masih lebih besar daripada pendapatan, jika startup tidak mendapatkan dana investasi, tentu saja riwayat mereka akan berakhir karena faktor kehabisan uang inilah yang menjadi salah satu faktor bangkrutnya startup. Kondisi burning money/cash burn tidak dapat dipastikan berapa lama hingga mencapai pendapatan yang diinginkan. Ovo merupakan layanan dompet digital asal Indonesia yang memudahkan penggunanya untuk bertansaksi di merchant yang menjalin kerjasama dengannya.

Preis-Kosten-Scheren im Telekommunikationssektor

For competition in telecommunications markets, tests for price–cost squeezes have become increasingly important, as both price differentiation between end users and product bundling based on regulated and unregulated inputs are on the rise. This study first summarises the theory of predatory pricing and European and German case practice regarding price–cost squeezes. On this basis, it suggests ways to pragmatically adapt the existing test procedure in order to better identify price–cost squeezes in specific tariffs/rate bundles.